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ABSTRACT 
Inductive Reasoning in Persecutory Delusional Thought 
by Ian Baker 
Delusions are considered to be one of the primary symptoms of psychosis but until recently 
have received little empirical investigation. One approach has been to examine the extent 
to which deluded individuals demonstrate cognitive biases which are different from those 
of normal controls in inductive reasoning tasks. In this study two hypothesis testing tasks 
were used to investigate cognitive biases in a group of people with persecutory delusions 
compared to a group whose delusions had remitted and a normal control group. 
Participants completed two tasks consisting of a series of visual discrimination problems in 
which they had to choose between pairs of stimuli presented on cards. Condition 1 
examined previously reported biases of deluded participants requiring less information 
before making judgements and being overconfident in their judgements. Positive or 
negative feedback was given after every card and participants were unconstrained in giving 
solutions. Condition 2 partially replicated Young and Ben tall's (1995) hypothesis testing 
study and examined participants' ability to process information sequentially and 
progressively focus down the set of possible correct solutions. Feedback was restricted and 
participant responding was constrained. 
No differences were found between groups in condition 1. In condition 2 deluded 
participants produced fewer hypothesis and sampled from a smaller range of hypotheses 
than remitted and control participants. Deluded participants also produced fewer correct 
hypotheses than the other groups. A trend was found for deluded participants to use fewest 
sensible responses to feedback, followed by remitted and control groups. The reverse trend 
was found for use of nonsensical responses to feedback. Limitations of the study, 
implications for clinical practice and suggestions for future research are considered. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
The introduction aims to review a wide range of research about delusions and re~soning in 
order to produce testable predictions about the cognitive processes of individuals with 
persecutory delusions. Although delusions are regarded as the hallmark of psychotic 
disorders surprisingly little is known about the psychological processes involved in their 
formation and maintenance. It is argued here that the role of cognitive bias is an important 
factor in delusional thought and that there are similarities to what is known in the much 
more fully investigated area of reasoning in 'normal ' individuals. It is proposed that 
cognitive biases will be evident in hypothesis testing tasks in deluded participants. 
The literature review examines traditional definitions of delusions together with the most 
influential conceptual issues. An outline of the major classifications of delusions is given. 
It is argued that traditional psychiatric conceptions are inadequate to account for the 
complexity of delusional thought and associated problems are discussed. 
A number of theories of delusion formation are considered. It is argued that delusional 
thought is likely to comprise of a number of factors but heuristic judgement and cognitive 
biases are necessary elements. Studies of reasoning in normal individuals are briefly 
discussed to provide a context in which to compare reasoning in deluded individuals. This 
is fo llowed by a review of empirical reasoning studies with deluded participants using 
inductive reasoning tasks and attribution theory. This provides the rationale for the present 
study and the resultant experimental hypotheses. 
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1.2 Definitions and classifications 
The definition and concept of delusions have been written about extensively and are often 
accepted without criticism. Attempts to provide classifications of delusions have also been 
numerous and fall into two broad categories: quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative 
classifications (e.g. Wing Cooper and Sartorius (1974) and Spitzer and Endicott (1978)) are 
descriptive in nature and have sought to identify and measure the content of delusions 
without considering distinctions in pathology or underlying process. ln contrast qualitative 
classifications (e.g. Blueler (1950), Jaspers (1963), Mayer-Gross, Slater and Roth (1960) 
and Schneider (1959)) involve the attempt to distinguish subtypes of delusions on the bases 
of theoretical explanations of underlying processes. 
Jaspers (1963) provides the most influential theoretical account of delusions and his ideas 
still dominate contemporary psychiatric definitions. Jaspers proposed that delusion is a 
term that can be applied to all false judgements which are characteristically 
i) held with extraordinary conviction, with an incomparable subjective certainty 
ii) maintained imperviously to other experiences and compelling counter-argun1ents, and 
iii) have impossible content. 
Jaspers argues that a delusion is a primary phenomenon which constitutes a transformation 
of one's total awareness of reality; it is entirely outside the normal range of experiences 
and so is impossible to understand and is qualitatively different from any normal 
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expenence. For Jaspers tlus contrasts with affective disorders of anxiety and depression 
which are exaggerated forms of normally encountered states. 
Jaspers makes the distinction between pnmary delusions which are psychologically 
irreducible and result from a pathological experience or personality change and secondary 
delusions wiUch can be understood in the light of related affect. Jaspers describes three 
sub-groups of delusions: 
i) delusional perception 
ii) delusional idea or notion, and 
iii) delusional awareness. 
Fundamental to Jaspers' understanding of delusions is tl1e incorrigibility of the belief. It is 
the absolute refusal to alter or modify beliefs despite subsequent reflection or external 
criticism that contrasts the deluded person with someone merely holding a different view 
from that of the majority. Although Jasper's work has been criticised it is important to 
outline IUs ideas in some detail as he fundamentally influenced the way in wiUch delusions 
are conceptualised. Current psyciUatric understanding of delusions still relies heavily on 
Jasper' s work and recent writing in tiUs area has added little to IUs ideas. Delusions are 
commonly defmed as absolute, discrete and discontinuous in nature. 
1.2. 1 DiaE"nostic interviews and systems 
The Present State Examination (PSE) schedule (Wing, Saratorius and Cooper, 1974) is a 
structured interview containing 22 categories of delusion e.g. reference, persecution, 
morbid jealousy. Delusions are defined as either primary or secondary and are rated as 
having partial or full conviction. The Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) (Spitzer, 
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Endicott and Robins, 1978) provides a similar system of descriptive classification to the 
PSE and provides a list of criteria for 26 categories of delusions. 
The Diagnostic and Statisitical Manual of Mental Disorders 3rd edition (DSM-111 APA, 
1987) definition of delusion illustrates the dichotomy made between normal and deluded 
thought: 
Delusion. A false personal belief based on incorrect inference about external reality 
and fim1ly sustained in spite of what almost everyone else believes and in spite of 
what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. 
The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's 
subculture (i.e. it is not an article of religious faith). 
Delusions are referred to frequently in the ICD-10 Classification of Mental and 
Behavioural Disorders (World Health Organisation, 1992) particularly in the categories 
F20-F29 - schizophrenia, schizotypal and delusional disorders. However as Sims (1991) 
comments the term delusion is not defined at any point and this has potentially serious 
implications for the effectiveness of this system. 
1.2.2 Problems in definition 
A number of authors have commented on the problems inherent in the traditional definition 
and conceptualisation of delusion (Strauss, 1969; Garety, 1985). These difficulties can be 
grouped into three main themes. 
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I . A delusion is a false belief or idea 
Moor and Tucker (1979) argued that the existing criteria of falsity and deviance of 
delusional beliefs were inadequate. They note that false beliefs are commonly held and if 
this were a sufficient condition for being deluded then the vast majority of people would be 
have to be regarded as deluded. They suggest that false beliefs may signify the presence of 
delusion but it should not be regarded as a defining condition. Assessing the deviance of a 
belief is also problematic in that it is difficult to know what 'normal' beliefs should be used 
for comparison. Cultural relativity is a significant issue in this respect and Moor and 
Tucker also suggest that if the deviant belief view is accepted, psychiatric diagnosis may 
be used to repress dissenting political minority views. 
2. Delusional beliefs are not amenable to reason or counterargument and are not 
modifiable by experience. 
Until comparatively recently it was generally considered pointless to engage with deluded 
individuals about their delusional beliefs (Slater and Roth, 1969, cited in John and 
Dodgson, 1994 ). However a growing body of research has shown that deluded beliefs can 
be modified by psychological interventions and that there are valid empirically based 
reasons for rejecting the view that delusions are never capable of modification (e,g, Watts, 
Powell and Austin, 1973; Chadwick and Lowe, 1990; Fowler and Morley, 1989; Kingdon 
and Turkington, 1991 ). 
This type of psychological approach is still in its infancy and its effectiveness and 
application are still being investigated. The cognitive approach to modifying delusional 
thought is based on similar assumptions to those in the treatment of depression. A 
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collaborative approach is emphasised and attempts are made to identify the cognitive 
schemata servmg to maintain beliefs and to access associated emotions. Alternative 
evidence is considered to explain the phenomena relevant to the delusion and beliefs are 
challenged with the aim of providing more adaptive interpretations. 
3. A delusion is held with absolute conviction 
An influential paper by Strauss ( 1969) based on empirical work showed that many 
delusions are not held with absolute conviction. He argued that it would be more useful to 
conceptualise delusions as points on a continuum with normal functioning. Strauss 
suggests three factors which seem important to distinguish between delusions and self-
deception: degree of conviction, time preoccupied with the belief, and implausibility of the 
claim. When conceptualised in this way delusion becomes a matter of degree. At one end 
of the spectrum are relatively common beliefs referred to as self-deceptions and at the. other 
end delusional beliefs which are characterised by high levels of conviction, preoccupation 
and implausibility. 
The approach of seeing delusions on a continuum with normal functioning has important 
implications both theoretically and practically. It implicitly suggests that individuals can 
move along the continuum towards normally held self-deceptions, and so makes possible 
techniques that would be discounted with a fixed and discrete view of symptoms. This 
view has been adopted by a number of researchers (Hole et al., 1979; Chapman and 
Chapman, 1980; Kendler et al., 1983;Garety, 1985; and Brett-Jones, Garety and Hemsley, 
1987). 
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Garety ( 1985) and Brett-Jones, Garety and Hemsley (1987) highlight problems inherent in 
trying to operationalise definitions of delusions and the need to question some previously 
held assumptions. The latter study devised a questionnaire to evaluate systematically 
delusional experience and found delusions to be multidimensional in character. Delusions 
were evaluated in categories of Conviction, Preoccupation, Inference, Reaction to 
hypothetical contradiction and Accommodation. Delusions were found to be markedly 
desynchronous and lacking eo-variance between the different categories of beliefs. 
It therefore appears that traditional psychiatric definitions and conceptualisations ~e in 
themselves inadequate to account for delusional thought. Delusions are more accurately 
seen as multi-dimensional in nature and on a continuum with normality. The definition of 
delusion in DSM-IV (AP A, 1994) reflects this more complex view. Delusional belief is 
defined as: 
A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly 
sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes 
incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not 
one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture (e.g. 
it is not an article of religious faith). When a false belief involves a value 
judgement, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgement is so extreme as to 
defy credibility. Delusional conviction occurs on a continuum and can sometimes 
be inferred from an individual ' s behaviour. It is often difficult to distinguish 
between a delusion and an overvalued idea (in which case the individual has an 
unreasonable belief or idea but does not hold it as firmly as is the case with a 
delusion). 
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1.3 Theoretical explanations of delusions 
Theories of delusion formation are numerous and have been generated from most 
psychological perspectives. Very little empirical research however has been carried out to 
test these theories (Winters and Neale, 1983). Most perspectives do not agree that 
delusions are psychologically irreducible and see them as secondary to more fundamental 
abnormalities e.g. of affect, personality, unconscious wishes, perception or judgement or 
organic impairment. 
1.3 .1 Disturbance in affect 
A few early theorists argued that exaggerated affect was the cause of delusionaJ thinking. 
Stock er ( 1940, cited in Arthur, 1964) reasoned that delusions could be traced to four affects 
- depressive, manic, anxious and suspicious. This and other early theories suggest that 
certain affective states cause delusional beliefs. Although many theorists regard affect as 
relevant either to the content of a delusion or to its formation and maintenance very little 
recent work has examined the direct relationship between affect and delusion. 
1.3.2 Psychoanalytic theories 
Psychoanalytic writers have provided the most extensive theoretical work about delusions. 
The most prontinent psychoanalytic theory of delusion uses the concept of projection (e.g. 
Freud, 191 5). Delusions are regarded as symptoms which act as projections of personal 
wishes, conflicts or fears to an externa! source. Freud argued that delusions of paranoia 
and grandiosity are the product of repressed homosexual impulses which are striving for 
expression. Winters and Neale (1983) revi.ew a number of studies which attempt to test 
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Freud's repressed homosexuality theory and concluded that the results are weak and 
conflicting. 
More contemporary psychoanalytic theorists postulate that delusions reflect the memories, 
affects and the phantasies of the individual before they ~ccumbed to psychosis (Freeman, 
1981, 1990; Nelki, 1988). These phantasies existed because anxiety or guilt prevented a 
satisfactory outlet for instinctual wishes either directly or in sublimated form. 
1.3 .3 Deficits in perception 
Early theorists viewed delusions as the individual making logical inferences about altered 
body sensations or perception (Winters and Neale, 1983). The modern advocate of this 
view is Maher (1974, 1988) who proposed that delusions result from a primary perceptual 
abnormality, which is biological in nature, and that involves vivid and intense sensory 
input. The individual experiencing these abnormal perceptions then seeks an explanation 
using normal cognitive mechanisms. In support of this view Maher cites evidence from the 
study of normal subjects under anomalous environmental conditions which suggests that 
irrational beliefs can be provoked. Building on earlier reports of an association between 
hearing loss and paranoid delusions in the elderly (Cooper et al., 1974) and in late onset 
schizophrenia (Kay et al., 1976), Zimbardo et al., (1981) proposed that a loss of auditory 
acuity, if unacknowledged, could be interpreted as other people whispering unfavourable 
things. It has also been proposed that delusions of misidentification result from disorders 
of facial recognition (Ell is and Young, 1990). 
Arthur (1964) notes that many theorists have assumed that some delusions are secondary to 
the experience of hallucinations and this is the view implicit in much contemporary 
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psychiatric literature (e.g. DSM-IV). The most comprehensive work investigating 
hallucinations was carried out by Slade and BentaJJ (1988) who identified a central process 
distinguishing between internally (imagined) and externally generated events. They .argue 
that hallucinations result from a failure in the skill of reality discrimination. It is therefore 
not the perception itself which leads to the experience of hallucinations but an inferential 
error made on the basis of that information. 
Although the abnormal perceptual theory has some appealing features it has been argued 
that it is essentially incomplete (Bentall, 1994). It is apparent that delusions often develop 
in the absence of any abnormal perception or experience (Chaprnan and Chapman, 1980). 
The theory also fails to explain why a delusional interpretation is offered for an unusual 
sensory experience when there are other more natural explanations which could easily be 
considered . 
1.3.4 Deficits in attention and consciousness 
Some researchers investigating schizophrenia have argued that delusions and other positive 
symptoms are the result of disorders of attention or consciousness. Hemsley (1993) 
proposed that the basic psychological dysfunction that characterises schizophrenia is a 
"weakening of the influences of stored memories of regularities of previous input on 
current perception". Individuals with schizophrenia are therefore less able to make use of 
the redundancy and patterning of sensory input to reduce information processing demands. 
Frith (1979) proposed that the symptoms of schizophrenia are the result of a defect in the 
mechanism that controls and limits the contents of consciousness. This ' filter' theory can 
be understood in terms of excessive self-awareness. Individuals with schizophrenia 
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become conscious of perceptions that normally would remain preconscious. Frith argues 
that this initiates an attempt for explanation of these percepts using normal reasoning. 
Delusions as well as thought disorder and auditory hallucinations may then result. 
Delusions may occur on the basis of hallucinatory experiences but also as a result of 
attention being captured by incidental details of the environment. 
Frith's (1987, 1992) more recent accounts of the positive symptoms of schizophrenic 
psychopathology centre on the hypothesis that willed intentions are not monitored 
correctly. Frith argues that there are two mechanisms involved in a central monitoring 
system. The first is operated by an external stimulus and in consultation with long-term 
memory, a stimulus intention is formed that can lead to an appropriate action. In Frith's 
formulation this process is not disturbed in schizophrenia. 
In the second route to action current goals or plans in conjunction with long-term memory 
form a willed intention. Frith argues that a failure to monitor intentions to act would result 
in delusions of control, thought insertion and thought control. This results from a 
disruption of intentionality, where thinking without awareness occurs, and so thoughts are 
interpreted as alien and having been inserted into the mind. Similarly if an individual is 
w1able to distinguish between events caused by their own actions and those generated 
externally then confusion in attributing the source of events is likely to occur. One result 
of this error may be the experience of auditory hallucinations in which the person hears a 
voice not recognised to be their own. 
Morris (1997) linked the concept of cognitive monitoring and intentionality to the idea of 
locus of control. The paper extends the idea of faulty monitoring to a wide range of 
abnormal experiences. Morris proposes that internally initiated behaviour which is 
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monitored as unintentional may explain passivity symptoms such as conversion disorder, 
somatisation disorder, delusion of control and depersonalisation. Conversely where 
monitoring signals behaviour to be internally initiated and controlled, but in reality it is 
externally controlled, it is argued that this may account for among other things, delusional 
guilt and delusions of grandiosity and persecution. Morris concludes that the most serious 
implication of viewing delusions in this way is that they would be amenable to treatment 
by psychological intervention. He suggests possible treatment may include providing 
discrimination training, counselling individuals to avoid situations which avoid faulty 
monitoring and the use of cognitive therapy to change beliefs arising from faulty 
monitoring. 
1.3.5 Neuropsycholo~ical theories 
Delusions have been associated with a fairly wide spectrum of cerebral disorders. Cutting 
(1985) argues that in some cases of schizophrenia, delusions may be caused by damage to 
right or left parietal lobe. He discusses statistical findings that there is evidence of an 
association between individuals with paranoid delusions and delusions of reference and 
lesions to the left temporal lobe (Too ne et al. , 1982) Cutting developed ideas about right 
parietal lobe damage and delusion formation caused by problems in perception. He uses 
the examples of Capgras syndrome and anosognosia. Capras syndrome is the delusional 
belief that a familiar person has been replaced by a double. Anosognosia is the belief that 
an obvious physical disability that is present in the person does not exist. Cutting argues 
that a link exists between these disorders and visual agnosia caused by orgaruc brain 
dan1age so inferring an underlying perceptual disorder. 
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McKenna (1987, 1991) argues that delusions are the result of an organic brain dysfunction 
impairing long term memory. He reasons that delusions are the consequence of 
dysfunction in the neural correlates implicated in memory. He cites studies implicating the 
hippocampus and related structures of the limbic system and the prefrontal cortex (e.g. 
Squire, 1987; BaddeJey and WiJson, 1987) which are involved in the formation and storage 
of long term memory. These neuroanatomical structures believed to be implicated have 
come to form a well defined complex known as the septo-hippocampal system (SHS). The 
most comprehensive formulation of the SHS and its basis for a theoretical model of 
schizophrenia was produced by Gray, F eldon, Rawlins, Hemsley and Smith (1991). 
McKenna (1991) extended the work by Gray et al (1991) to speculate how the SHS might 
be involved specifically in delusional thought. 
A large number of experimental animal studies have concluded that the SHS has no simple 
motor, sensory, learning or emotion function. It appears that in a general way the SHS 
facilitates efficiency and flexibility in learning. Animals with damaged SHSs display 
complex behavioural changes with increased tendency to perseveration and disinhibition. 
The animals still maintain the ability to learn and unlearn but the process is slower and 
more insensitive. Gray et a! (1991) propose that the function of the SHS is to compare 
actual sensory data with expected predictions of what should be the case based on past 
experience. If actual and expected match the SHS has a passive role allowing current 
motor responses to occur as planned. If there is a mismatch between actual and expected 
the SHS takes over active control of behaviour and the engaged motor plan is inhibited, 
arousal sharply increases and alternative behaviours are instigated to attempt to resolve the 
discrepancy. In a less clear way the system also acts in the storage and updating of 
information about the relationships between events and their consequences. 
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McKenna (1991) argues that a neglected aspect of Gray et al's (1991) account is a 
consideration of the behavioural consequences of the SHS becoming damaged by excessive 
doparninergic activity and becoming abnormaJiy biased to its passive match function. He 
argues that this would be consistent with the subjective experience of delusions. Neutral 
stimuli would be erroneously identified as important and so acquire abnormal significance; 
there would be a tendency for expected to be falsely judged as matching actual and so 
predictions would be erroneously verified as correct; falsely matched information would be 
passed on and stored so altering the stored regularities used to make future predictions and 
plans for motor behaviour would continue to be elaborated although they would be 
inappropriate for the environmental stimulus. 
l.3.6 Abnormal reasoning 
A number of theories have argued that delusions are the product of faulty reasoning. V on 
Domarius (1944, cited in Garety, 1991) was the first to propose that delusions arise from a 
failure of deductive reasoning. This theory was abandoned when it was found that non-
deluded people were also not very skilled at this type of reasoning. In many ways this 
theoretical perspective has evolved through the gaps in the abnormal perception theory to 
account convincingly for delusional thought and the important part judgement and 
reasoning plays in normal subjects. Reasoning biases are implicated in delusions because 
not all subjects under the same conditions develop delusional beliefs and because delusions 
do not appear to arise necessarily from abnormal perceptual experiences. Chapman and 
Chapman ( 1988) examined the relationship of beliefs to experience in a large group of 
students and found that subjects responded to similar experiences with beliefs which 
ranged from the normal to the fully delusional. 
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The most contemporary cognitive models of delusional thought are provided by Bentall 
(1994) and Garety (1991). Both authors stress the provisional nature of their ideas. 
Bentall proposed an outline model in which beliefs arise from perceived data in the world, 
inferences are made and a belief is generated. An information search may or may not 
occur to corroborate or refute these beliefs. Bentall argues that delusions reflect 
abnom1alitiies at one or more of these stages, although additional factors may contribute to 
delusion formation. 
Garety' s (1991) model is illustrated in Figure 1. Box 1 represents the cognitive state of the 
individual before a delusional belief has been formed. This influences the information that 
is detected and selected. If the material is expected and neutral in content, it is ignored. 
More salient material continues to be processed and is dependent on the judgmental style 
of the individual and results in the formation of a belief. Garety suggested that perceptual 
abnormalities will account for some delusions where the type of information processed is 
unusual e.g. in a drug induced psychosis and in some neurological impairments. However 
where the perceptual system is not so disrupted, judgmental processes will be the decisive 
factor in delusion formation so that in some cases there will be no abnormal perception. 
Reinforcement and searches for confirmatory evidence serve to maintain the delusional 
thought. 
Both models are in the early stages of development and more work is needed to specify the 
perceptual and reasoning biases that are thought to be involved in delusion formation. The 
role of emotion in the models also remains to be investigated. 
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Figure 1. Garety's Model of Belief Formation (factors implicated in delusion formation in bold) 
PR IOR EXPECTATIONS 
from e.g. 
past learning 
affect and associated 
cognitions 
personality 
2 I 
CURRENT INFORMATION 
e.g. 
expected •• unexpected 
external -- internal 
clear -- ambiguous 
common •• unusual 
neutral -- affectively loaded 
voluntary ··involuntary 
publ ic --private 
irrelevant-· relevant 
I 
I 
3 If 
' Information 
e.g. 
expected 
common 
external 
neutral 
IGNORE 
-
4 
INFORMATION PROCESSING 
STYLE 
(perception & inference) 
e.g. 
focus on current stimuli -- use 
past learned regularities 
rapid -- cautious 
overconfident-- underconfident 
cognitively simple -- complex 
low IQ -- high IQ 
5 
, 
I 
BELIEF 
I 
6 
' 
+ 
REINFORCEMENT 
e.g. anxiety reduction 
-
If 4a 
..----------, 
.,Fail to use 
~- learned regu larities 
HIGH AROUSAL 
7 
SEARCH FOR 
(confirmatory) 
EVIDENCE 
defence against depressive .... 
-
cognitions 
An obvious difficulty that emerges in exploring the reasoning of deluded people is absence 
of a norm for correct or normal reasoning. Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom (1983) proposed 
that Baysian inference provides a general framework for evaluating beliefs in the normal 
population and that it may be used to describe a person's consistency with, or departure 
from the model. Hemsley and Garety (1986) applied this model to the inferences of 
deluded individuals and argued that it provided a useful framework for evaluating 
reasorung. 
1.4 State or trait factors 
Another interesting but uninvestigated area concerns whether delusions are state or trait 
factors and whether different types of delusions exhibit different temporal patterns. Some 
psychiatric disorders are characterised by transient delusional beliefs while others are 
accompanied by more intractable and stable delusional thought. Many patients suffering 
from delusions follow a recognised course where they become florid, their symptoms remit 
and they relapse again into psychosis. Butler and Braff ( 1991) argue that sensory overload 
may precipitate the onset of delusions and that the fixity and duration of delusion may 
relate to whether the underlying sensory dysfunction is fixed or trait related. They 
reasoned that fixed delusons may be correlated with fixed sensory registration and 
information processing dysfunctions while less fixed delusional states may reflect more 
labile sensory and information processing disturbances. It remains a matter of speculation 
what other factors could be correlated with delusional state. 
1.5 Reasoning in normal subjects 
One of the evident difficulties with the investigation of cognitive processes leading to 
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belief formation in delusions is that the rules of normal reasoning are not fully un<j.erstood. 
However in contrast to the psychiatric literature there has been extensive empirical 
investigation of reasoning in normal subjects, based on a large variety of experimental 
studies conducted within the areas of both cognitive and social psychology. It has been 
debated whether human thought is rational, irrational or a mixture of the two (Johnson-
Laird, 1982), or if it is an issue which experimental psychology can or should address 
(Evans, 1992). Since the 1970s experimentally derived evidence has been claimed for a 
large number of biases in reasoning and judgement. These are summarised in Table 1. 
Availability biases A variety of biases attributed to individuals judging event 
probabilities by the ease with which examples can be brought to 
mind 
Belief in the law of small Individuals ignore or give insufficient weight to sample s ize in 
numbers judging likelihood of means and proportions 
Base rate fallacy lndividuals ignore base rate infonnation when assessing posterior 
possibilities 
Illusory correlation Individuals perceive correlations in random data that accord with 
prior beliefs 
Anchoring biases Individuals anchor subsequent judgements to initial ones 
Conjunction fallacy Under some circumstances individuals will judge the conjunction of 
two events to be more probable than one component in isolation 
Hinds ight biases Individuals given outcome knowledge overestimate the chance th&t 
they could have made a correct prediction 
Overconfidence I miscalibration Individuals systematically overestimate the probability that their 
judgements are correct 
Vividness Individuals overweight infonnation that is emotionally interesting, 
image provokjng, etc. 
Fundamental attribution error A tendency to attribute behaviour to actor's disposition and ignore 
situational variables 
Table 1. Main judgmental biases and description of beliefs 
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The impetus for the volume of research in this area arose from the now classic work of 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1982). In summary this work has shown that people are 
highly fallible and have a tendency make particular kinds of reasoning errors. Rachrnan 
(1983) in his review of irrational thinking and cognitive therapy succinctly summarises 
much of the findings: 
"People are inclined to place disproportionate evidential value on recent events, 
events of personal salience, vivid events, and events that they feel are 
representative. They tend to place undue emphasis on information which is easily 
available (to the neglect of equally or more important information that is not 
immediately accessible). People tend to neglect statistical data, to ignore base rates 
and to express and follow inconsistent intuitions. They are capable of holding 
contradictory views simultaneously." p68 
The major influence of Kahneman and Tversky was to develop the idea that many of these 
cognitive errors are caused by the use of "judgmental heuristics" which serve to reduce the 
difficulties of assessing probabilities and of predicting outcomes. The idea of heuristics 
was taken from other areas of problem solving and is a set of ' rule of thumb' strategies 
which lead to quick answers but are prone to errors. Kahneman and Tversky proposed a 
number of heuristics but the most significant and influential are representativeness, 
availability and anchoring. 
1.5. 1 Biases in reasoning 
It is possible to select some of these biases in normal hwnan reasomng which have 
important implications for the way in which delusions are defined and conceptualised. A 
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widely researched reasoning bias has been labelled the confirmation bias. This is the 
tendency for individuals to test hypotheses in biased manner such as to avoid finding 
discorrfirming evidence. Wason (1960) developed an inductive reasoning task known as 
the '2 4 6' problem in which participants have to guess a rule that the experimenter has in 
mind which can be used to classify sets of three numbers. Participants have to generate 
three numbers of their own and are told by the experimenter whether the set conforms or 
not with the experimenter's rule. 2 4 6 is given as an example but the rule is 'any 
ascending sequence' . Results show that participants tend to generate more complex 
hypotheses of the rule and give many examples which confirm their hypothesis and 
become convinced that their rule is correct. Wason found that a significant proportion of 
participants did not cmTect their initial responses even when all the relevant information 
was made available to them to show that they were wrong. Making comment on this 
striking effect not to defend their evidently false reasoning Wason states " the most salient 
feature of performance is the participants ' incorrigible conviction that they are right when 
they are, in fact, wrong" (p.365). 
Belief bias is another robustly demonstrated cognitive tendency in which a bias is evident 
in the evaluation of evidence (Evans, Barston and Pollard, 1983). It is proposed that in 
deductive reasoning tasks participants' abi lity to generate or evaluate a conclusion as valid 
(whether it logically and necessarily fol lows from the premises) is impaired when they 
hold relevant prior beliefs. Thus believable conclusions are more likely to be judged valid 
than unbelievable conclusions. Ross and Anderson (1982) argue that it is highly likely that 
our beliefs influence the process by which we seek out, store and interpret relevant 
information. Pollard ( 1982) argues that believable conclusions may be more ' available' 
and that belief bias may reflect a rational strategy in everyday reasoning. 
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The literature of reasoning in normal subjects clearly demonstrates that subjects are not 
logical, rational beings; indeed they are fallible and prone to reasoning errors. · The 
dichotomy between deluded and normal reasoning appears not to be as clear as originally 
thought. It seems more likely that the delusional thought represents a quantitative rather 
than qualitative difference from normal performance and that maintaining an already 
strongly held belief in the face of contradictory evidence is not in itself abnormal. 
1.6 Abnormalities of deluded reasoning 
There have been a large number of studies examining reasoning and cognitive disorders in 
people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (e.g. McReynolds et al., 1964; Abroms .et al., 
1966 and McCormick and Broekema, 1978). Recent research has identified specific 
infom1ation processing deficits that include (a) problems with elementary functions such as 
selective attention towards relevant stimuli and sustained attentions over long periods of 
time (Oltmanns and Neale, 1975; Neuchterline, 1977); (b) problems with complex 
functions such as encoding and recognition of familiar cues, storing information for future 
retrieval or deductive or analagous conclusions from available information (Broga and 
Neufeld, 1981 ; Neuchterline and Dawson, 1984); and (c) problems with executive 
functions and response selection (Broen and Storms, 1967, Weinburger et al. , 1986, 1988). 
However, there are substantially fewer studies which specifically examine reasoning in 
deluded subjects. It has been suggested that this is because for the 20 years following the 
mid-sixties researchers in this area focused their attention almost solely on the syndrome of 
schizophrenia (Persons, 1986). 
More recently delusions and other symptoms of psychosis have been studied as isolated 
phenomenon because of their intrinsic interest and because of doubts about the validity of 
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the diagnostic categories for schizophrenia (Bentall, Jackson and Pilgrim, 1988). 
Reasoning biases in deluded people predominantly have been examined from two main 
perspectives: attribution theory and inductive reasoning tasks. 
1.6. 1 Studies based on attribution theory 
One approach to investigate reasoning in delusional thought is provided by attribution 
theory which offers a framework for understanding the explanation that individuals give 
for their own behaviour and for the behaviour of others. Attribution theory is concerned 
with how individuals perceive and make use of information to arrive at causal explanations 
of social events. It has been argued that this perspective is particularly appropriate as many 
of the delusions experienced by psychotic subjects seem to concern the patient's place in 
the social world and his or her beliefs about the intentions of others (Bentall, 1994). 
The first investigation of attributional style was conducted on individuals specifically 
selected for the presence of persecutory delusions (Kaney and Bentall, 1989). The 
experimental group (n= 17) was matched with a psychiatric control group of clinically 
depressed participants (n= l6) and a normal control group (n= l7) with no known 
psychiatric history. The study used the Attribution Style Questionnaire (ASQ) which 
required participants to generate possible causes for hypothetical positive and negative 
events. Participants rated their own causes on scales of internality, stability and globalness. 
Results showed that both deluded and depressed participants had excessively internal, 
stable and global attributions for negative events. However in contrast to depressed 
participants the deluded group also made excessively internal, global and stable attributions 
for positive events. Put simply, the experimental group showed a systematic bias to blame 
others if something went wrong and conversely an equally systematic and excessive 
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tendency to credit themselves if something went right. Kaney and Bentall suggested that 
such an attributional style would leave individuals vulnerable to making both persecutory 
and grandiose interpretations of life events. 
These findings were consolidated by Candido and Rornney (1990) who studied non 
depressed paranoids, depressed non-paranoids and a control group of patients who were 
both paranoid and depressed using the ASQ. The paranoid group showed the opposite 
attributional style to the depressed group in attributing good events to themselves and bad 
events to others or to chance. The observation that participants with persecutory delusions 
have exactly the opposite attributional bias to that of depressed participants was explained 
by assuming that they have an exaggerated "self-serving bias". It has been argued that the 
purpose of this attributional style is to maintain self-esteem (Hews tone, 1989). 
The self-serving bias in deluded participants was investigated further in patients with 
persecutory delusions (n=14) and depressed (n=14) and normal controls (n=14) by Kaney 
and Bentall (1992). Participants were asked to play two computer games in which they had 
to make choices between stimuli presented on a screen. Incorrect choices led to loss of 
points and correct choices added points to the participant' s score. Without the participant's 
knowledge the games were pre-programmed so that the outcome of the game was 
predetermined with one game (the lose game) leading to a net loss of points and one game 
(the win game) leading to a gain of points. After each game participants were asked to rate 
their control over the outcome of the score. Deluded participants showed a strong self-
serving bias in that they perceived greater control over outcomes in the win condition 
compared to depressed and normal controls. 
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Lyon, Kaney and Bentall (1994) devised a study using subjects with persecutory delusions, 
depressed and normal controls to further test the theory that persecutory delusions serve the 
function of defending against low self-esteem. A method of accessing defended feelings of 
low self-esteem was devised in the Pragmatic Inference Task (PIT). Performance on this 
measure was compared with the open assessment of attributions using the ASQ. Lyon et al 
found that on the open ASQ where participants were aware of being tested, deluded 
participants demonstrated external attribution for negative events (blamed others). On the 
opaque PIT which camouflaged questions in a memory task and subjects were unaware that 
their attributions were being examined deluded participants displayed an internal 
attribution (self blame) for negative events and an external attribution for positive events. 
The authors concluded that persecutory delusions serve to defend the individual against 
deeply held feelings of low self-esteem and camouflage a depressive attributional style. 
A different aspect of the attributions made by individuals with pesecutory delusions was 
studied by Bentall, Kaney and Dewey (1991) who looked at explanations made by deluded 
participants for the social behaviour of others. Using Kelley's (1967) theory of social 
attribution the choice of person, circumstance and stimulus attributions for a · series of 
social vignettes describing interactions between two persons were examined. The study 
used all but one of the participants who took part in Kaney and Ben tall ' s (1989) research. 
Participants were asked to rate how certain they were in their choice ranging from very 
certain to very uncertain on a five point scale. It was found that the deluded individuals 
made excessive person attributions for negative events. They also were excessively certain 
about their judgements compared to the depressed controls. As in Kaney and Bentall 
(1989) and Candido and Romney (1990) where deluded participants showed a bias hot to 
attribute negative events in which they were involved to themselves, in this study they 
showed a similar bias of not blaming the victim in negatively valued social interaction in 
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which they were not involved. When asked about the accuracy of their judgements 
deluded participants were relatively overconfident, a finding consistent with that of Huq et 
al., (1988). 
In an attempt to replicate findings using individuals with persecutory delusions Fear, Sharp 
and Healy (1996) examined cognitive processes in individuals (n=29) diagnosed with 
delusional disorder. The research aimed to test the ideas that delusions represents a single 
conceptual entity regardless of the different sub-types of delusion. Among other things the 
study compared levels of depression and attributional style in individuals with persecutory 
and non-persecutory delusions and normal controls. The study replicated previous 
attributional fmdings of deluded participants (Kaney and Bentall, 1989; Candida and 
Rornney, 1990) and showed excessively external and stable attributions for. negative 
events and excessively internal attributions for good events. In contrast to previous results 
deluded participants did not show abnormal levels of overt or camouflaged depression. 
The authors interpreted the results to support the view that delusions represent a unitary 
concept irrespective of content. 
A debatable point concerning all Ben tall et a/ 's work is the refusal to rely on traditional 
psychiatric diagnostic classifications for inclusion criteria. Critics may argue that this 
compromises research design in that experimental and psychiatric control groups contain 
heterogeneous diagnoses. This may limit the application and acceptance of research 
findings as classification by diagnostic categories is the most widely used system. In 
favour of Bentall 's approach is that such objections ignore the serious problems of the 
validity of traditional psychiatric classifications and deny the rationale for this type of 
study which seeks to investigate symptoms and not syndromes. 
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1.6.2 Studies based on abstract reasonin~ tasks 
A second although not entirely separate approach to the study of reasoning in people with 
delusions has been based on abstract reasoning tasks. In an attempt to test Magaro's 
(1980) cognitive model of paranoia and schizophrenia Brennan and Hemsley (1984) 
compared paranoid (n= 11) and non-paranoid (n=8) schizophrenics on their formation of 
illusory correlations. An illusory correlation is the report by an observer of a correlation 
between two events which in reality are not correlated. The paranoid participants were 
deluded while the non-paranoid group exhibited hallucinations, thought-disorder and 
incongruity of affect. The authors reported that the paranoid group perceived particularly 
strong illusory correlations compared with non-paranoid and normal groups on a task 
involving stimuli relevant to subjects with paranoid delusions. 
Using an emotionally neutral probabilistic inference task and Bayes' decision theorem 
Huq, Garety and Hemsley (1988) investigated inductive reasoning in deluded individuals. 
The experimental participants were 15 people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and 
delusional symptoms; the psychiatric control group consisted of 1 0 patients with a variety 
of psychiatric conditions and the normal control group consisted of 15 volunteers with no 
psychiatric history. The experimental task was to decide which of two jars coloured beads 
were being selected from, with participants having prior knowledge of the proportions of 
bead colours in each jar. Very few decision errors were made overall. Deluded 
participants in comparison to controls were found to request significantly less information 
before reaching a judgement and expressed higher levels of confidence in their judgements. 
Interestingly on these two measures, number of draws to decision and initial certainty, the 
deluded sample's responses were more rational according to Bayes' theorem, so 
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theoretically making them more objectively rational than the control groups. There was 
considerable variability within the experimental group with seven individuals (47%) 
making a decision after the very fust draw. A post hoc analysis did not point to any clear 
differences between the extreme responders and the other deluded participants. Because 
normal participants typically perform conservatively compared to Bayes' theorem the 
authors interpreted this finding as evidence of an abnormal bias in some deluded subjects 
of drawing on little evidence and being overconfident. 
A follow-up of this study reported by Garety, Hemsley and Wessely ( 1991) used 
essentially the same neutral probabilistic inference task to examine reasoning in deluded 
schizophrenic (n=l3) and paranoid participants with delusional disorder (n= l4). Two 
control groups were used, one with 14 participants receiving treatment for anxiety disorder 
and one with no history of psychiatric treatment. Groups were matched for age, gender and 
intelligence. The study replicated the principal finding of Huq et al. (1988) that a 
proportion of deluded subjects request fewer items of information before reaching a 
decision. A small number of extreme responders was again evident in the experimental 
group. It was also found that deluded participants were more likely to change their 
estimates of the likelihood of an event when confronted with potentially disconfirmatory 
information. The authors took this finding to support the view that deluded individuals are 
not characteristically incorrigible. The other finding of Huq et al, that deluded participants 
express higher levels of certainty after the first item of information is presented was not 
replicated. 
Although the experimental procedure was simplified using two conditions rather than the 
four used by Huq et al (1988) both studies can be criticised for their complexity and 
abstract nature. The possibility that some participants did not fully understand what was 
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required of them was not considered, and provides an alternative explanation for the group 
of extreme responders found in both studies. In common with the other papers reviewed 
this study can be criticised for the small numbers used. 1l1e inclusion criteria for the 
experimental group were not rigorous, so allowing a variety of delusional sub-types to be 
treated as a single psychological entity. Also no data were provided on other aspects of the 
participants' current symptomatology. Some participants in the psychiatric control group 
were diagnosed as suffering from manic depression and may have been deluded in the past. 
John and Dodgson ( 1994) extended this area of study and used the "Twenty Questions 
Game" as a more ecologically valid inductive reasoning task. The study aimed to 
investigate the strategies that deluded individuals use when testing hypotheses. The study 
used an experimental group of 11 deluded individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
and one with paranoid schizophrenia. The psychiatric control group consisted of 12 
depressed participants and the normal control group of 12 volunteers. 
The study again found that deluded subjects requested less information, and made guesses 
more readily than volunteer and psychiatric controls. Deluded participants gathered 
significantly less information overall compared to control groups, made significantly 
greater number of incorrect direct guesses, and made significantly fewer responses overall. 
The authors concluded that reasoning processes of deluded participants are qualitatively 
different from those in normal reasoning processes. The functional significance for 
deluded subjects in tllis type of reasoning was discussed from a number of perspectives 
although the authors noted that the study was compromised by the fact that a considerable 
proportion of both patient groups gave up before completing the task. 
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Using a different type of inductive reasoning task Young and Bentall (1995) studied the 
hypothesis testing skills of patients with persecutory delusions using a visual 
discrimination task adapted from Levine (1966). Participants were required to complete a 
series of problems in which they had to choose between pairs of stimuli presented on cards. 
Following positive or negative feedback from the experimenter participants' ability to 
progressively narrow down the set of possible correct solutions was assessed. No 
differences were found between the deluded and control groups in the range or number of 
hypotheses generated. Deluded participants were less inclined than controls to stick to 
hypotheses when given positive information and were more inclined to stick to their 
hypotheses following negative feedback. They also showed less evidence of ' focusing' 
down their hypothesis to an overall correct solution in response to successive feedback. 
Young and Bentall interpreted this last fmding as directly conflicting with the findings of 
Huq el a! (1988) and Garety et al., (1990), that deluded participants reached decisions more 
rapidly than controls. Young and Bentall proposed that there exist basic deficits in the 
ability of deluded participants to make use of sequential information. This was defined as 
being able to generate a set of potentially correct solutions to a problem, testing hypotheses 
and progressively narrowing down the set of possibly correct answers on the basis of 
feedback. The authors proposed that a difficulty in integrating information over time 
would be likely to lead to early responding in tasks where participants were free to respond 
and so avoid making judgements on the basis of a sequence of information. 
I . 7. Summary 
Delusions in their own right have received little experimental attention until recently. 
However, the small number of studies investigating cognitive bias in deluded subjects 
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appear to show some consistent findings. Studies using tasks based on social attribution 
theory indicate that subjects with persecutory delusions make excessively external, stable 
and global attributions for negative events and excessively internal, stable and global 
attributions for positive events. In assessing the social behaviour of others it appears that 
these subjects are as unwilling to attribute negative events to victims as to themselves. 
These judgements are held relatively over-confidently. In can1ouflaged assessments of 
attributions people with persecutory delusions blamed themselves for negative events and 
made external attributions for positive events. These findings support the theory that 
persecutory delusions are a camouflaged form of depression and that the delusions fulfil 
the function of protecting self-esteem. 
In unconstrained inductive reasoning studies deluded participants have shown a tendency 
to jump to conclusions when evaluating evidence, to be relatively over confident in their 
judgements and contrary to previously widely held assumptions, change their opinions in 
the face of potentially disconfirmatory evidence. There is some evidence that a cognitive 
bias is also shown in tasks requiring sequential processing of information by deluded 
subjects being less able to progressively work to a conclusion. 
A serious objection can be made about the interpretation in all the cited studies concerning 
the causal status of the observed cognitive biases. All that can be demonstrated in studies 
of this type of cross sectional design is that there is an association between a particular 
cognitive style and particular type of psychopathology. Most studies can be criticised for 
the vague criteria that were used in forming experimental groups; only recently have 
attempts been made to study reasoning biases in a more clearly defined delusional 
population. It is unlikely that different types of delusion share a common cognitive 
mechanism and that these are the same in the formation and maintenance of delusions. All 
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the studies can be criticised for relying on small subject numbers. Very significantly no 
longitudinal studies have been attempted to investigate changes in reasoning biases with 
the onset and remission of symptoms. 
1.8 Conclusions and introduction to the present study 
It has been argued that delusions are complex multi-faceted phenomena with numerous 
factors involved in their formation and maintenance. Recent studies have provided 
evidence that traditional definitions are inadequate to account for this complexity and that 
it is most useful to conceptualise delusional thought as being on a continuum with 'normal' 
thinking. It has been shown that it is over simplistic to characterise delusional thought as 
categorically irrational, bizarre and incorrigible. An investigation of reasoning processes in 
non-psychiatric individuals also shows a lack of logic and rationality, and that 'normal ' 
reasoning contains similar biases attributed to deluded thought. 
The study of delusions had primarily been theoretical and a number of these perspectives 
have been reviewed. It is thought likely that factors such as personality, unconscious 
wishes, affect, perceptual abnormality, deficits in attention and consciousness, neurological 
impairment and cognitive bias may all contribute to the formation and maintenance of 
delusional thought. However it is argued here that a crucial factor is that perception cannot 
be separate from inference: cognitive biases exist and there is growing evidence that 
difference biases can be systematically demonstrated in deluded and non-deluded thought. 
The main findings from experimentally based studies conclude the literature review. 
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1.8.1 This study 
The aim of this study was to further examine the existence of cognitive biases in the 
inductive reasoning of deluded participants. In line with the majority of recent research it 
was decided to focus on individuals suffering from persecutory delusions. This 
acknowledges the complexity and variety of psychological processes that are involved in 
different categories of delusional thought and makes possible valid comparison with other 
studies using this deluded sub-group. In general the paranoid sub-type of schizophrenia 
also typically involves the presence of especially prominent systematised delusions in the 
absence of thought disorder. 
The aim of the study was to examine the contention made in Young and Bentall's study 
(1995) that the inability of deluded participants to integrate infom1ation over time results in 
early responding in unconstrained inferential reasoning tasks and to inability to focus down 
efficiently on sequential information processing tasks. It would seem useful to compare 
performance on a task with conditions likely to demonstrate biases found in unconstrained 
inductive reasoning tasks with a sequential information processing task using the same 
participants. 
Two experimental conditions couched as games were therefore devised to test this 
prediction using modified hypothesis testing tasks. Both experimental conditions consisted 
of a set of visual discrimination problems in which participants had to choose between 
pairs of stimuli presented on cards. Condition 1 was an evaluative hypothesis testing task 
in which feedback was given after every response and participants were free to give their 
solutions to the problem at any point. Condition 2 was a partial replication of Young and 
Bentall' s (1995) study assessing hypothesis testing in a sequential information processing 
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task in which feedback is limited by the experimenter and participants are not free to 
terminate the task when they wish. Subjective certainty levels were obtained in both 
conditions. Levels of depression were also assessed to test Ben tall's (1994) theory that the 
presence of persecutory delusions acts as a camouflaged form of depression. 
A further aim of the study was to explore hypothesis testing in individuals whose delusions 
had remitted. No previous research has examined whether cognitive biases or deficits are a 
state or trait of delusional thought. As this work is exploratory, no specific hypothesis 
were made about the performance of remitted participants on either hypothesis testing 
tasks. 
1.8.2 Hypotheses with rationales 
The following hypotheses were tested: 
Condition 1 
1. Remitted participants will have higher levels of depression as measmed by the Beck 
Depression Inventory than deluded participants. (This based on Bentall' s (1994) theory 
that persecutory delusions serve to increase levels of self-esteem.) 
2. Deluded participants will make judgements about the rule in fewer trials than controls. 
(Tllis is based on the experimental findings ofHuq et al. , (1988), Garety et al. , (1991) and 
John and Dodgson (1994) in which deluded participants were found to request less 
information before making a judgement.) 
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3. Deluded participants will express higher certainty levels about their judgements than 
controls. (This hypothesis seeks to test the findings of Huq et al. ( 1988), and Kaney and 
Bentall (1989), but it was not replicated in Garety, et al., (1991) that deluded participants 
are relatively over confident in their judgements.) 
4. Deluded participants will make more errors in estimating the rule correctly than 
controls. (This result was evident in the study of John and Dodgson (1994) but was not 
found by Huq et al., (1988)or by Garety et al., (1991). The hypothesis testing task used in 
this study is more similar to that used by John and Dodgson as it is an evaluative task and 
it is predicted that the consequences of deluded participants not being able to integrate 
information over time will lead to more errors). 
5. In deluded participants there will be a positive correlation between high certainty scores 
and early responding and in control participants there will be a negative correlation 
between these variables. The correlation coefficients will be significantly different from 
each other. (Huq et al. , (1988) and Garety et al., (1991) found the first part of the 
hypothesis to be the case and it is reasonable to suppose that control participants will 
exhibit the opposite tendency and be more confident in the accuracy of their hypotheses 
when they have received more information). 
Condition 2 
6. There will be no significant difference in the number of hypotheses produced by the 
deluded and control groups. (Hypotheses 6 and 7 are based on the findings of Young and 
Bentall (1996) although their study predicted deluded participants to produce significantly 
fewer hypotheses from a smaller range of hypotheses). 
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7. There will be no significant difference in the range of hypotheses produced by the 
deluded and control groups. 
8. Deluded participants will form fewer correct hypotheses than the control group. ·(This 
is to test Young and Bentall's (1995) assertion that deluded participants will be less able to 
integrate sequential information over time and so will be less accurate in hypothesis 
formation.) 
9. Deluded participants will express lower certainty levels about their judgements than 
controls. (This is not based on any empirical evidence but on the speculation that lack of 
confidence will be exhibited by the deluded group when they are not able to respond early.) 
10. Deluded participants will be less inclined to stick to hypotheses following positive 
feedback than controls. (Hypotheses 10 and 11 seek to replicate fmdings from Young and 
Bentall, (1995)). 
11. Deluded participants will be more likely to stick to hypotheses following negative 
feedback than controls. 
12. Deluded participants will make more errors in estimating the rule correctly than 
controls. (A consequence of producing fewer correct hypotheses than controls will be for 
deluded participants to make more errors in estimating the rule for each trial.) 
13. Deluded participants will more frequently be unable to form any hypothesis at the end 
of the task than controls. (From Young and Bentall (1995) that deluded participants wilJ 
not be able to focus down to a specific solution as well as controls.) 
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Chal)ter 2. Method 
2. 1 Selection of participants 
Three groups of participants took part in this study with 12 individuals in each group. 
Attempts were made to match participants for age, sex and years in full-time education. 
Staff at four community mental health teams and three psychiatric in-patient wards were 
consulted to suggest potential participants. Criteria for inclusion in the deluded group were 
that the person had been diagnosed as suffering from persecutory delusions and had no 
organic brain damage and no history of alcohol or substance abuse. Similar criteria were 
applied to the remitted group except that their delusions had to have been in remission for a 
period of one month or longer. The control group consisted of volunteers with no history 
of psychiatric illness. 
Local ethical committee approval was received for the study (Appendix 1) and forty-nine 
people who were currently deluded or whose delusions had remitted were invited to take 
part in the study (Appendix 2). Twenty-six people agreed to participate. One remitted and 
one control participant started the experimental tasks but chose not to complete them. 
2.1.1 Deluded ~roup 
The deluded group consisted of eight males and four females currently suffering from 
persecutory delusions and who were receiving psychiatric treatment at the time of testing. 
The mean age was 34.8 years (SD=11.8), range 20-57 years. The mean age on leaving 
fu ll-time education was 17.8 years (SD= 3.0), range 15-22 years. Eleven participants had a 
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and one had a diagnosis of delusional disorder. Six of 
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the participants were seen whilst they were psychiatric inpatients. All participants were 
being prescribed neuroleptic medication at the time of testing. Table 2 lists the· main 
delusional themes for this group. 
Participant Delusional beliefs 
PI Male Believed friends out to harm him 
P2 Female Believed others trying to give her diseases 
P3 Female Believed neighbours persecuting her. Bullied by police 
P4 Male Believed people in downstairs flat out to get him by sending 
poisonous fumes through floor 
P5 Female Believed a group of men trying to rape her 
P6 Male Believed other inpatients trying to harm him with needles 
P7 Female Believed people hated her and wanted her to commit suicide 
P8 Male Believed God punishing him for past misdemeanours 
P9 Male Believed others trying to poison his food 
PlO Male Believed men trying to give him AIDS 
Pll Male Believed neighbours bugging his house and could read his 
thoughts 
Pl2 Male Believed figures in authority conspiring against him 
Table 2. Main persecuto.r:y themes for participants in deluded jUOUp 
2.1.2 Remitted jUOUp 
This group contained eight males and four females all of whom were outpatients at the 
time of testing. The mean age of the group was 34.0 years (SD=8.6), range 20-47 years. 
The mean age of leaving full-time education was 17.3 years (SD=2.6), range 15-21 years. 
All participants had a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and all were being prescribed 
neuroleptic medication. Criteria for inclusion in this group were that participants had 
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experienced persecutory delusions in the past, but that for at least the past month the 
delusional beliefs had been in remission. Participants were receiving psychiatric treatment 
either by attending a day centre or were being monitored by a community psychiatric 
nurse. 
2.1.3 Control 2roup 
These participants were volunteers drawn from nursing, portering and administrative staff 
from Delancey Hospital, Cheltenham. Participants were matched for age, sex and years in 
full time education with the deluded group and consisted of eight males and four females. 
The mean age of the group was 34.2 years (SD=10.2), range 21-55 years with a mean age 
of 17.3 years in full-time education (SD=l.7), range 16-22 years. The criterion for 
inclusion in this group was having no history of psychiatric illness. 
2.2 Materials and procedure 
Participants in the deluded and remitted groups were tested indivi.dually either in hospital 
(n=6), at a day centre (n=15) or at the person's home (n=3) by the author. The tasks took 
between 30 minutes to an hour to complete. Both conditions consisted of a two choice 
visual discrimination task in which participants were required to discover a rule for making 
correct choices. To provide continuity between the tasks and to facilitate comprehension 
the task were couched in terms of a game. 
In both conditions each problem was represented by a set of 16 laminated cards, 12cm x 
12cm, each containing one of two shapes (circles, 2cm diameter or cross, 2cm x 2cm) that 
differed along dimensions of colour (red or blue), number (two or four shapes) and position 
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(left or right on the card). There were therefore two levels of each dimension making a 
total of eight possible stimulus combinations. For example within a given problem each 
stimulus might either be a circle or cross, blue or red, be two or four in number and be 
positioned on either the right or left of the card. This set of combinations has the property 
of being internally orthogonal so that both levels of every dimension appear exactly twice 
with both properties of every other dimension. Both conditions consisted of three trials. 
2.2.1 Condition 1 
Condition 1 formed an evaluative hypothesis testing task devised to correspond with 
certain experimental conditions found in the studies of Huq et a/ ( 1988) and Garety et a/ 
( 1991 ). These were that feedback was given after every response and that participants 
were free to give their solution when they chose. After giving their answer for each trial 
participants were asked to rate how certain they were that they had solved the problem 
correctly on a five point Likert scale (Appendix 4). 
2.2.2 Condition 2 
Condition 2 was a modified version of the focusing task originally devised by Levine 
( 1966) and that was replicated using deluded participants by Young and Ben tall ( 1995). 
The materials and aim of the task were the same as in condition 1 except that participants 
received feedback only on trials 1, 6 and 11, which were the designated feedback trials. 
The remaining trials were non-feedback trials where no response was given by the 
experimenter. Also participants were not free to give a solution until all 16 cards had been 
presented. When a participant gave a solution they were again asked to rate how certain 
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they were that they had provided the correct solution. The order of presentation of cards in 
both conditions were randornised within trials and between groups (Appendix 5). 
An example of stimulus cards for condition 2 is shown in Figure 2. The A cards shown on 
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the left of Figure 2 were allocated to the non-feedback presentations. The remaining B 
cards were allocated to feedback trials. Thus feedback using B cards was always separated 
by presentation of each of the four A non-feedback cards. A consequence of the stimulus 
combinations being intemally orthogonal is that participants' hypotheses can be inferred 
from the four non feedback presentations. Some sequences of A cards are consistent with 
the formation of a specific hypothesis whereas some are inconsistent with a definite 
hypotheses (see Table 3). 
Response pattern Hypothesis 
LLLL Left 
LLRR Cross 
LRLR Red 
LRRL Four 
RRRR Right 
RRLL Circle 
RLRL Blue 
RLLR Two 
LLLR No hypothesis 
RLLL No hypothesis 
LRLL No hypothesis 
LLRL No hypothesis 
RRRL No hypothesis 
RLRR No hypothesis 
RRLR No hypothesis 
LRRR No hypothesis 
Table 3. Determination of participants' hypotheses by pattern of response over non-
feedback presentations (adapted from Silbennan et al .. 1983). The hypotheses shown are 
correct in relation to the non-feedback series shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Example of stimulus material used in condition 2 
A 1 Non-feedback cards A 81 Feedback cards 8 
++ ++ 
++ ++ 
A2 82 
+ + 
+ + 
A3 83 
++ ++ 
++ ++ 
A4 84 
+ + 
+ + 
'il 
Features for each problem were randomly selected in advance and feedback g1ven 
dependent on the participants' choice of card. Because of the internally orthogonal 
construction of the cards feedback always resulted in just one possible correct answer for 
each problem by the time that the final sequence of four B cards was presented. At the 
start of any problem the participant is faced with a choice of eight possible hypotheses. 
After presentation of the first feedback card (trial 1) the number of possible hypotheses is 
reduced to four. After the presentation of the second feedback card (trial 6) the perfectly 
logical participant should have the option of two hypotheses remaining. After the third 
feedback card (trial 11) only one possible hypothesis should remain. As detailed earlier, it 
is possible to work out participants' formation of hypotheses from the sets of non-feedback 
cards. 
2.2.3 Instructions to participants. 
The instructions to participants were adapted from those described by Levine (1966) and 
were as fo llows: 
"In this game I will show you a series of cards like this one. Each card has a number of 
features. Each card will have a circle and a cross and they will be either red or blue. You 
can see that there are either two or Jour of the shapes and that of course one is on the right 
and one is on the lefi of the card. For each game one of the features of the card has been 
chosen in advance. This chosen feature will not change as we go through the game. The 
aim of the game is for you to work out which feature has been chosen and to tell me which 
shape shows it and I'll tell you whether you are right or wrong. In this way you can work 
out if the chosen feature is the colour, the shape, the number or the position on the card. 
Try to work out the chosen feature as quickly as possible so you can choose correctly as 
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often as possible. I will ask you how sure you are that you have worked out the chosen 
feature correctly" (participant showed Likert rating scale). 
After one sequence of 10 practice cards in which 'blue' responses were given positive 
feedback the participant was asked "What was the chosenfeature?". If the participant gave 
an over elaborate answer the experimenter replied "The problem is no/ as complicated as 
that. In this practice game one of the shapes, colours, numbers or positions has been 
chosen and is always correct. Let 's try again". No participant was allowed to begin the 
test problems until he or she demonstrated an understanding of the task by successfully 
determining the solution to a 10 card practice gan1e. 
Condition 1 was run and instructions were: 
"After each card in this game I will tell you whether your choice was correct and you can 
either ask for another card or you can stop the game and tell me what feature you think 
had been chosen. You can ask for up to 16 cards. Make a guess as soon as you think you 
know what the chosen feature is." 
After each trial the experimenter said: 
"Now we will do the same again. Bear in mind that the chosen feature may have 
changed" 
Instructions for condition 2 were: 
"In the last game I said right or wrong after each card For this next game I will give you 
fewer clues and will not always tell you whether you are right or wrong After some cards 
I will say nothing Don't let that worry you. Try and concentrate and to be correct each 
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time. This game will last for 16 cards and at the end I will ask you if you think you know 
what the chosen feature was. Again I will ask you to rate how certain you are that you are 
correct." 
2.3. Piloting 
As both conditions contruned alterations from previous studies a small pilot study was 
carried out on two deluded people and two people without psychiatric problems. The 
results indicated that the tasks were quickly understood and that they could be administered 
and scored relatively easily. 
The process initiated several changes in wording to make the tasks more easily 
comprehensible The main alteration was to half the number of trials in both conditions 
from six to three. The deluded subjects found it difficult to keep their attention on task and 
found six trials of each task too repetitious and demanding. 
2.4 The Beck Depression Inventory 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) was completed by the participant after completion 
of the reasoning tasks. The BDI is a 21 item self-rating scale which is commonly used to 
asses the severity of depression in psychiatrically diagnosed patients (BDI; Beck Ward, 
Mendelsohn, Mock and Erbaugh, 1961 ). Reliability studies (Beck et al., 1988) have 
shown a high degree of internal consistency, in that all item scores correlate highly with 
total score and high split-half reliability has also been found . Independent validation 
studies have shown a range of usually high correlations of BDI scores with other measures 
of depression (Beck et al., L 988). 
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Chapter 3. Results 
3 .1 Description of the methods of data analysis 
Data was analysed using SPSS and Statistica computer software. Descriptive data of each 
variable were analysed for measures of central tendency and displayed as frequency 
djstributions. In general and as group sample sizes were equal for all comparisons it was 
considered that the use of parametric statistics (ANOV A and Pearson Product Moment 
Correlation) was justified. Where assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance 
were violated it was judged that parametric statistics were sufficiently robust to produce 
only minor effects on results. 
Randornised block design ANOVAs were used as participants were matched. Tukey HSD 
tests were used for post-hoc analysis of statistically significant ANOV A results. This is the 
most conservative type of test for planned comparisons of between three and five group 
means (Howell, 1992). Where means were converted into proportions non-parametric 
Friedman tests were used. 
3.2 Description of sample 
A total of 36 participants took part in the study, 24 males and 12 females. The mean age 
and years in education of the participants are shown in Table 4. 
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Deluded Remitted Controls 
Age 
Mean 34.8 34.0 34.2 
(Standard deviation) (11.8) (8.6) (10.2) 
Range 20-57 20-47 21-55 
Years in education 
Mean 17.8 17.3 17.3 
(Standard deviation) (3 .0) (2.6) (1.7) 
Range 15-22 15-21 16-22 
Table 4. Means (standard deviation) and range of age and years m education of 
participants. 
One way ANOV As showed no significant differences between groups for age 
(F(2,22)=.208, p= .81) and years in education (F(2,22)=.167, p= .85). 
Analysis of the distribution of sexes in the sample using the chi-square test showed that 
there was no difference in the composition of males and females between groups cx~.oo, 
df=2, p=l.O) but there were significantly more men than women (X2=4.0, df=1 , p= .045). 
This is a reflection of the higher prevalence of schizophrenic type disorders in men than 
women. 
Participants were matched by years in education as a rough measure of intelligence. To 
test how well this controlled intelligence years in education was correlated with the three 
measures of correct problem solving in the two conditions. A significant but modest 
correlation existed between years in education and number of trials correctly solved in 
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condition 2 (r= .30, p=. 041, 1 tailed test), but not between education and number of trials 
correctly solved in condition 1 (r=0.003, p= > .05, Hailed test) or the number of hypothesis 
correctly formed in condition 2 (r=-1.0, p=2.9, 1 tailed). It therefore appears equivocal 
that years in education acted as a satisfactory control for intelligence in this study. It is 
possible that a cohort effect existed for younger and older participants in that the mean age 
for leaving full time education has increased in the past few decades irrespective of 
intelligence. 
3.3 Condition 1 
Hypothesis 1 stated that remitted participants will have higher levels of depression as 
measured on the Beck Depression Inventory than deluded participants. The mean scores 
obtained from the Beck Depression Inventory are given in Table 5. 
Group Deluded 
Mean 18.8 
(Standard deviation) (12.8) 
Range 7-41 
Remitted 
13.5 
(8.5) 
4-26 
Control 
6.5 
(4.2) 
0-14 
Table 5. Means (standard deviations) and ranges of Beck Depression Inventory scores 
A one way ANOV A showed that there was a significant difference in depression scores 
between groups (F(2,22)=6.76, p= .005). Tukey HSD tests indicated that the deluded 
group had significantly higher scores of depression than the control group (p= .003) but not 
than the remitted group (p= .213). There was no significant difference between the 
remitted and the control groups (p= .117). 
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Hypothesis 2 stated that deluded participants will make judgements about the rule in fewer 
trials than controls. The maximum number of trials for a judgement to be made was 16. 
The mean scores for numbers of trials to make a judgement about the rule are given in 
Table 6. 
Group 
Mean 
(Standard deviation) 
Range 
Deluded 
3.3 
( 1.5) 
1-7 
Remitted 
3.3 
(1.0) 
2-7 
Control 
3.8 
(l.O) 
2-6 
Table 6. Means (standard deviation) and ran~es of scores for number of trials to make a 
jud~ement about the rule. 
A one way ANOV A showed there was no significant difference between groups on the 
number of trials taken to reach a judgement in this condition (F(2,22)= .954, p= .40). 
Hypothesis 3 stated that deluded participants will express higher certainty ratings about 
their judgements than controls and hypothesis 4 that deluded participants will make more 
errors in estimating the rule than controls. Table 7 shows means, standard deviations and 
ranges of certainty ratings and correctly solved rules for the three groups. 
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Group Deluded Remitted Control 
Certainty 
Mean 4.0 3.8 4.3 
(Standard deviation) (1.0) (1.0) (0.7) 
Range 1-5 1-5 2-5 
No correct 
Mean 2.1 2.4 2.5 
(standard deviation) (1.0) (.67) (.67) 
Range 0-3 1-3 1-3 
Table 7. Means (standard deviations) and range of certainty ratings and number of 
correctly solved rules. 
One way ANOV As showed that there were no significant differences in judgement 
certainty levels between groups (F92,22)= 1.27, p= .30) nor in the number of correctly 
solved rules (F(2,22)=.906, p=.42). 
Hypothesis 5 stated that in deluded participants there will be a positive correlation between 
high certainty scores and early responding and in control participants there will be a 
negative correlation between these variables. The correlation coefficients were also 
hypothesised to be significantly different from each other. 
The number of trials taken to reach a judgement and the certainty rating for the judgement 
were analysed for each group using Pearson's Product Moment Correlation. The 
correlation coefficient and the probability levels for these variables are given in Table 8. 
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Group 
Correlation 
Probability level 
Deluded 
-.46 
.064 
Remitted 
-.43 
.083 
Control 
-.45 
.066 
Table 8. Correlation coefficients and probability levels (1 tailed test) for number of trials 
taken to reach a judgement and certainty rating. 
All three groups show negative correlations between number of trials taken to make a 
decision and judgement certainty levels. However none of the correlations reached a level 
of statistical significance and did not differ from each other (Z= -.71, 2-tailed, p= >.05). 
3.4 Condition 2 
A series of analyses were carried out on the participant's hypothesis testing skills in 
condition 2. Hypotheses 6 and 7 stated that there will be no significant difference in the 
nwnber or range of hypotheses produced between deluded and control groups. The 
maximum number of hypotheses that could be generated by participants during testing on 
the three trials was nine and the maximum range of hypotheses to be drawn from was 
eight. Hypothesis 8 stated that deluded participants will make more errors in correctly 
estimating the rule than controls. A hypothesis was deemed correct if it was consistent 
with the total information available at the at the last point at which feedback was given. 
The means, standard deviations and ranges of the total nwnber, range and correctly 
estimated hypotheses formed are shown in Table 9. 
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Group Deluded Remitted Control 
Total (Max=9) 
Mean 5.6 5.8 7.5 
(Standard deviation) (1.83) (1.99) (1.38) 
Range 3-8 2-9 5-9 
Range (Max=8) 
Mean 2.9 3.5 4.5 
(Standard deviation) .90 1.0 1.2 
Range 2-5 2-5 3-6 
Correct 
Mean 2.8 4.3 5.3 
(Standard deviation) 1.6 1.7 2.4 
Range 0-7 1-7 2-9 
Table 9. Means (standard deviation) and ran~e of number. ran~e and correct hypotheses 
formed by groups. 
A one way ANOV A indicated that there was a significant difference between groups in the 
number of hypotheses formed (F(2,22)= 3.841 , p= .037). Further post-hoc comparisons 
showed that the control group produced significantly more hypotheses than the deluded 
group (p= .046) but not more than the remitted group (p= .090). There was no significant 
difference between the deluded and remitted groups on this measure (p= .941). The result 
indicates that the deluded group formed significantly fewer hypotheses than the control 
group during the task. 
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A one way ANOV A also showed a significant difference between groups on the range of 
hypotheses used (F2,22)= 8.27, p= .002). Post-hoc analysis found the deluded group to use 
a significantly smaller range than controls (p=.OO 1) but not than the remitted group (p= 
.225). There was no significant difference in the range of hypotheses used by remitted and 
control groups (p=.070). The result indicates that the deluded group selected their 
hypotheses from a significantly smaller range of hypotheses than control subjects. 
Consistent with hypothesis 8 a further one way ANOV A showed a significant difference 
between groups on the number of correct hypotheses generated (F(2,22)=5.1 0, p= .015). A 
priori planned comparisons found the deluded group produced significantly fewer correct 
hypotheses than both the remitted group (t=1.91 , df=ll , p= .041) and the control group 
(t=3.41, df= ll , p= 003). There was no significant difference in means between the 
remitted and control groups (t=1. 19,df=ll , p= .131). 
Hypothesis 9 stated that deluded participants will express lower certainty levels about 
having solved the rule correctly than controls. The means (standard deviation) and range 
of certainty levels are shown in Table 10. 
Group 
Mean 
(Standard deviation) 
Range 
Deluded 
3.5 
(1.6) 
0-5 
Remitted 
3.0 
(1.8) 
0-5 
Control 
4.1 
(1.2) 
0-5 
Table l 0. Means (standard deviation) and range of certainty judgements. 
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A one way ANOV A showed no significant difference between the groups on this measure 
(F(2,22)= 2.22, p= .13). Therefore although deluded participants made significantly more 
errors than the control group there was no difference in certainty of having solved the rule 
correctly. This may support the hypotheses that deluded participants are over confident in 
their judgements compared to non-deluded controls. 
Hypotheses 10 and 11 stated that deluded participants will be less inclined to stick to 
hypotheses following positive feedback and more inclined to stick to hypotheses following 
negative feedback. Participants responses following positive and negative feedback were 
analysed. Logically it is more reasonable to stick to an existing hypothesis following 
positive feedback and to change hypotheses following negative feedback. As feedback was 
dependent on the participants' choice of card this resulted in unequal proportions of 
positive and negative feedback between groups. However analysis using the chi-square 
test showed no significant difference in frequency of positive and negative feedback 
between groups (X2= 1.26, df= 2, p=>.05). 
Participant's responses over the four non-feedback cards following each presentation of 
feedback were classified in 'stick', 'change' or 'no hypothesis' . The proportion of 
hypotheses from each group classified as ' stick' and ' change' after presentations of 
positive and negative feedback are shown in Figures 3 and 4. This shows that there is a 
tendency in all groups to stick following positive feedback and to change following 
negative feedback. 
Using a Friedman test the proportions of the number of hypotheses stuck to after positive 
feedback between groups were analysed. There was no significant difference between 
groups on this measure (X2= 3.81 , df=2, p= .15). Similarly the proportions of hypotheses 
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Positive Negative 
~Deluded 
----Remitted 
--Control 
Figure 3. Proportion of unchanged (stick) hypotheses following positive and negative 
feedback 
Positive Negative 
~Deluded 
----Remitted 
--Control 
Figure 4. Proportion of changed hypotheses following postive and negative feedback 
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changed after receiving negative feedback did not differ significantly between groups (X2= 
4.29, df=2, p= .12). 
The relationship of logical responses to feedback was further analysed by calculating 
'sensible' and ' nonsensical ' responses to feedback. 'Sensible' responses were calculated 
by adding the number of hypothesis stuck to following positive feedback to the number of 
hypotheses changed following negative feedback for each group. The proportion of 
'nonsensical ' responses were calculated by adding the number of hypotheses changed 
following positive feedback to the number of hypotheses stuck to following negative 
feedback. Figure 5 shows the proportion of sensible and nonsensical responses for the 
different groups. This shows a clear interaction between group and response to feedback. 
The trend is for deluded subjects to use the fewest sensible strategies and the most 
nonsensical strategies following feedback with the control group utilising the most logical 
responses, and the remitted group falling between deluded and control groups for both 
types of response. 
A Friedman test showed a significant difference between groups for use of 'sensible' 
responses to feedback (X~ 8.79, df-2, p= .012). Further analysis using Page's L Trend 
Test showed there was a significant trend in the predicted direction (L=153, n=l2, p< .05) 
with the deluded group using least, followed by the remitted group and the control group 
using the largest number of sensible responses to feedback. 
A Friedman Test on the use of nonsensical responses to feedback also showed a significant 
difference between groups (X2=6.17, df=2, p= .046). Use of Page's L Trend Test showed a 
significant predicted trend (L=l55, n= 12, p< .05) with the deluded group showing the 
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-+-Deluded 
----Remitted 
-,....-Control 
Sensible Nonsensical 
Fi2Ure 5. Ranked means of sensible and nonsensical responses to feedback for deluded. 
remitted and control groups 
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largest number of nonsensical responses, followed by the remitted group and then the 
control group. 
At the end of each trial participants were asked if they had an idea of which feature had 
been chosen. Hypothesis 12 stated that deluded participants will make more errors in 
estimating the rule than controls. Hypothesis 13 stated that deluded participants will more 
frequently be unable to form any hypothesis at the end of trials than controls. This was an 
attempt to asses the whether deluded participants found it more difficult to focus down to a 
solution than controls.. Table 11 shows the means (standard deviations) and range of 
number of final hypotheses formed and numbers of correctly solved rules for each group. 
Group Deluded Remitted Control 
Final No 
Mean 2 .7 2.4 2.8 
(Standard deviation) ( .50) (1.0) (.56) 
Range 0-2 0-3 1-3 
No correct 
Mean 1.4 1.6 2.3 
(Standard deviation) (1.1) (1.3) (1.1) 
Range 0-3 0-3 0-3 
Table 11. Means (standard deviation) and ran~e for final number of hypotheses and 
correctly solved rules 
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One way ANOV As showed that there was no difference between groups on both measures 
of numbers of final hypotheses formed (F(2,22)=.853, p= .44) and number of correctly 
solved trials (F(2,22)=1.79, 0= .19). 
As the deluded group scored significantly more highly on the BDI this measure was 
correlated with the dependent variables in which significant differences between groups 
had been observed. This was to investigate the possibility that the deluded participants' 
poorer performance was associated with and potentially caused by depressed mood. Table 
12 shows correlations between BDI, number and range of hypotheses and number of 
correct hypotheses. 
Measure BDI 
Number of hypotheses -0.122 
(n s) 
Range of hypotheses -0.232 
(n s) 
Correct hypotheses -0.240 
(n s) 
Table 12. Pearson correlations (2 tai led test) between BDI and number. range and correct 
hypotheses 
The correlation coefficients between the three variables were all negative but did not reach 
statistical significance. This indicates that a higher level of depression was not associated 
with deficits in hypothesis testing skills and so did not act as a confounding variable. 
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Chapter 4. Discussion 
4.1 Summary of results 
This study investigated the inductive reasoning skills of people suffering from persecutory 
delusions in comparison to a group whose delusions had remitted and a volunteer control 
group using two types of hypothesis testing tasks. Both experimental conditions consisted 
of a set of visual discrimination problems in which participants had to choose between 
pairs of stimuli presented on cards. Condition 1 was a hypothesis testing task in which 
participants were unconstrained and feedback was given after every response. Condition 2 
was a sequential information processing task in which participants were required to focus 
down to an overall solution by logically testing a series of self-generated hypotheses. 
Feedback was limited and participants were not free to terminate the task at will. 
The results obtained give some specific support to the theory that different cognitive biases 
are evident in people with persecutory delusions compared to normal controls. Evidence 
was obtained to support the prediction that the inability of deluded participants to integrate 
information over time results in an inability to focus down efficiently on a sequential 
information processing tasks. Cognitive deficits were demonstrated in the deluded group 
who formed fewer hypotheses, from a smaller range and produced a smaller number of 
correct hypotheses than controls. There was also a difference in the number of rational and 
irrational responses to feedback between groups. Deluded participants used the fewest 
number of sensible responses, followed by the remitted group, with the control group using 
the largest number. The opposite was observed for use of nonsensical responses to 
feedback. This is important as it demonstrates a dissociation effect of cognitive bias in 
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deluded participants which cannot be accounted for purely m terms of generalised 
impairment. 
No support was obtained for the prediction that biases exist which lead deluded 
participants to early responding in an unconstrained inferential reasoning task and the study 
failed to replicate any of the predicted findings in condition one. 
4.2 Condition l 
The deluded group scored as significantly more depressed than both the remitted and 
control group. This measure was included to test Bentall's (1994) theory that persecutory 
delusions serve to increase self esteem and to camouflage depression. The findings do not 
apparently support this theory in that if a simple linear relationship existed between mood 
and the presence of persecutory delusions it would be expected that the remitted group 
would present with higher levels of depressive symptomatology than the deluded group. A 
comparison of the BDI scores in deluded patticipants shows a very similar moderate level 
of depression in this study and in those reported by Bentall and Kaney (1989) and Bentall, 
Kaney and Dewey ( 1991 ). The significantly higher level of depression in the deluded 
group in this study is consistent with the finding of Chadwick and Lowe' s (1990) study of 
cognitive therapy in delusional patients where in some individuals a decrease in delusional 
intensity was accompanied by a lowering of BDI score. 
In condition 1 none of the hypotheses related to the experimental task were supported and 
no significant differences were found between groups on any of the dependent variables. 
Specifically there were no differences in the number of trials taken to make a judgement on 
the task which conflicts with the findings of Huq et al., (1988), Garety et al., (1991) and 
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John and Dodgson (1994) in which deluded subjects were found to request less information 
than controls before making a judgement. Deluded participants did not therefore 
demonstrate a bias of jumping to conclusions. Similarly there was no difference between 
groups in their level of certainty about their judgement. This conflicts with the findings of 
Huq et al. (1988) and Bentall, Kaney and Dewey (1991) in which deluded participants 
were found to be overconfident, but is concordant with the findings of Garety et al., 
(1991). 
Few errors were made in correctly estimating the rule and this did not differ between 
groups. This indicates that in this task the hypothesis testing abilities of deluded subjects 
are comparable to that of remitted participants and non-deluded controls and supports the 
contention that all participants understood the task similarly. No associations between 
certainty levels and number of cards drawn were found: in deluded participants early 
responses were not correlated with higher certainty scores and in control subjects later 
responding was not correlated with higher certainty scores. There was no difference 
between the correlation coefficients for these variables for the two groups. 
There are a number of possible explanations for these findings. An initial consideration is 
the type of experimental task used. An important distinction can be made between the 
cognitive strategies required in evaluation and estimation tasks (Hogartb and Einhorn, 
1992). In evaluation tasks evidence is encoded as positive or negative relative to the 
hypothesis under consideration. In contrast, estimation tasks involve assessing some kind 
of "moving average" that reflects the position of each new piece of evidence relative to the 
opinion currently held. This condition used a neutral evaluative hypothesis testing task 
which has not previously been reported in the literature. The studies by Huq et al. (1988) 
and Garety et al. ( 1991) used a neutral probabilistic inference task. A possible explanation 
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for the different findings in the present study is that the different tasks require different 
reasoning strategies and so may reveal different reasoning biases. 
A problem with this line of argument is that John and Dodgson (1994) found the predicted 
reasoning biases in deluded participants using an evaluative hypothesis testing task. 
However the properties of the tasks used by Garety et al. and John and Dodgson are 
notably different. The Twenty Questions task used by John and Dodgson is less restricted 
in general task requirements and has the scope to detect a larger range of errors than the 
tasks used by Huq et al. and Garety et al. The current study very closely replicated the 
experimental conditions of the latter studies and provided similar opportunities to 
demonstrate the predicted biases. 
Another possible explanation for the difference in results is that both the studies of Huq et 
al and Garety et al concluded that the reasoning abnormalities looked for in condition 1 
may be confined to a subgroup of deluded individuals. The latter study investigated the 
factors associated with extreme responding but failed to identify specific characteristics of 
those patients using abnormal reasoning. The difference in findings may be due to the 
selection criteria of participants. In this study participants were chosen because of the 
presence of persecutory delusions whereas in the other studies broader inclusion criteria 
were used. 
One problem with the results of Huq et al and Garety et al is that it is not clear precisely 
how the findings should be interpreted. It may be that participants were responding 
impulsively to the most recent information with which they had been presented. This may 
be connected with difficulty in selective attention. It could also be that deluded 
participants were exhibiting abnormal Bayesian reasoning (Hemsley and Garety, 1986) in 
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which information was being weighted differently from control participants. As pointed 
out by Garety et al (1991) tasks that result simply in more errors in experimental 
participants are problematic to interpret clearly .. It is therefore more useful to use tasks that 
investigate styles of cognitive processing rather than general deficits. 
4.2.1 Implications of findings of condition 1 
Although the fmdings did not support any of the experimental hypotheses several things 
can be inferred from the results. Firstly it is clear that providing the conditions of an 
unconstrained hypothesis testing task are in themselves insufficient to demonstrate any 
differentiation in cognitive biases that might exist between deluded and non-deluded 
participants. The features of unconstrained responding and immediate feedback are also 
not directly associated with demonstration of these biases. It can also be inferred that the 
presence of persecutory delusions is not a feature of participants associated with the 
predicted cognitive biases. From this it can be concluded that the biases shown in previous 
studies are not particularJy robust. This is anticipated by Huq et al. , (1988) who are 
cautious about the reliability of their findings. It remains a matter for future research to 
more specifically examine the extent to which the biases can be demonstrated and to 
identify the characteristics of participants and reasoning tasks which are associated with 
them. 
4.3 Condition 2 
Condition 2 assessed the ability of participants to process information sequentially and 
focus down to a correct solution using a hypothesis testing strategy. Results indicate that 
deluded participants demonstrated a deficit in reasoning strategies on this task. Contrary to 
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hypotheses 6 it was found that the deluded group formed a significantly smaller number of 
hypotheses during this task than the control group. For each set of four non-feedback cards 
it is possible to choose an order which is either consistent or inconsistent with one definite 
hypothesis. To form a hypothesis requires a degree of logical tenacity and patience and the 
recognition that no information is gained by changing the choice of hypothesis before 
feedback is received. 
Hypothesis 7 was also not supported and deluded participants selected hypotheses from a 
significantly smaller range of hypotheses than the control group. Deluded participants 
were therefore making a selection from a significantly smaller pool of information. This 
may be because deluded participants have a reduced information processing capacity and 
so are restricted in the scale of hypotheses which they test. An alternative reason for this 
may be that deluded participants are demonstrating a strong belief bias. As outlined in the 
introduction this is the tendency for reasoning to be influenced by relevant prior beliefs. It 
may be that deluded participants are more heavily influenced by previous feedback and 
prior expectations and so restrict the range of hypotheses they test. 
The deluded group also produced significantly fewer correct hypotheses than remitted and 
control groups. For a hypothesis to be judged correct requires not only the responses to 
feedback over the four consecutive feedback trials to be consistent with one hypothesis, but 
also the hypothesis to be consistent with the information that is known at that point. This 
is a direct measure of the ability to focus down to one correct overall hypothesis and to 
integrate information over trials and formed the most cognitively complex element of this 
study . This last finding partially supports Young and Bentall's (1995) result in which a 
significant one way ANOV A was obtained indicating a trend for deluded participants to 
74 
make fewer correct hypotheses than controls. However in their study this difference was 
not supported by further post-hoc comparisons. 
The fmding that deluded participants produced fewer correct hypotheses than remitted 
participants is significant as this identifies a cognitive deficit specifically associated with 
the presence of delusions or possibly some other factor correlated with this group e.g 
medication. The process of producing a correct hypothesis depends primarily on logical 
processmg. It is possible that the inability to marshal memory capacity in the context of 
logical processing IS involved in this deficit. However a number of alternative 
explanations also exist for these fmdings. It is likely that the deluded group were generally 
less physically and mentally active than the other groups. The opportunity for effortful 
mental exertion may therefore be more limited and deluded participants less accustomed to 
periods of mental concentration. The cognitive deficits may be the result of general 
cognitive inactivity. 
The reasorung deficits may also be artefacts of impaired memory, attention or 
organisational capacities. Although no independent measures of these factors were 
assessed some inferences about them can be made. The information processing demands 
are deliberately kept low on the task. Silberman et al. , (1983) estimated that four items 
have to be held in memory for approximately 15 seconds in order to be able to solve the 
problem. Simple memory failure alone is therefore unlikely to account for the poorer 
performance of deluded participants on this task. Specific attentional deficits however may 
also contribute to poorer focusing ability. 
Another possibility is that neuroleptic medication may lead to bradyphrenia and contribute 
to the impaired cognitive performance. Although levels of medication were not quantified, 
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all participants in the remitted group were also being prescribed similar medicine at the 
time of testing. The effect of neuroleptic medication on cognition is not known and is 
discussed more fully later in the study. 
Contrary to hypotheses 1 0 and 11 analysis of responses following positive and negative 
feedback showed that there was a tendency for all groups to retain hypotheses following 
positive feedback and to shift hypotheses following negative feedback (Figures 3 and 4) 
and there was no difference between groups on these measures. This contrasts with the 
findings of Young and Bentall (1995) who found that deluded subjects in comparison to 
controls were less inclined to stick to their hypotheses following positive feedback and 
more likely to stick to hypotheses following negative feedback. Deluded participants in 
this study therefore responded more appropriately to feedback than in the original study. 
Combining responses following positive and negative feedback to produce proportions of 
sensible and nonsensical responding showed a significant difference between groups. A 
significant difference was found in which deluded participants used the least number of 
sensible strategies, followed by the remitted group with the control group using the greatest 
number. The opposite effect was found in the use of nonsensical responses to feedback 
resulting in a clear interaction effect (Figure 5). The results do not show that deluded 
participants have more difficulty responding to positive or negative feedback per se but 
that there is a composite deficit in the absence of sensible strategies and the use of 
nonsensical strategies. This effect is less strong in the remitted group but still significantly 
different from the performance of normal controls. 
These results imply that in deluded participants not only are there core abstract reasoning 
deficits in the production of hypothesis but also deficits exist in how these hypotheses are 
76 
modified in response to feedback. In this task deluded participants were less able to 
evaluate information and respond to feedback appropriately than remitted and control 
groups. The study therefore showed a dissociation in cognitive performance by deluded 
participants between conditions 1 and 2. This is important because had the deluded group 
shown poorer performance on both hypothesis testing tasks it could have been argued that 
all that was being demonstrated was a global cognitive deficit leading to impaired 
performance. The dissociation gives specific information about the experimental 
conditions which demonstrate cognitive bias and how they are shown. 
On the more global measure of the ability to focus down to a fmal hypothesis no difference 
was observed between groups in the number of fmal hypotheses formed at the end of the 
task and there was no difference between groups on the numbers of correctly solved rules 
for each group. This suggests that although deluded participants were not reasoning as 
efficiently and used a more 1 imited set of hypotheses, they were still able to perform 
equally on the general task of working out which feature had been chosen in advance. This 
may have been the product of guesswork because even if all information had been 
disregarded except feedback on the final trial, the participant is left with a 1 in 4 chance of 
correctly finding the solution. 
Contrary to hypothesis 9 there was no difference between groups on subjective ratings of 
certainty about having solved the task correctly. In this task all three groups expressed the 
same levels of certainty and performed similarly well in terms of solving the tasks. This is 
consistent with the results obtained in condition 1. 
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4. 3.1 Implications of findin2s from condition 2 
Some of the main findings of this study are at variance with the conclusions of Young and 
Bentall (1995). This study demonstrated the main effects that Young and Bentall predicted 
but did not find in their study that deluded participants formed fewer hypotheses, from a 
smaller range and with a fewer number of correct hypotheses. It is important to try and 
determine why this smaller study found differences not observed in the original study. The 
most obvious difference between the two studies was the number of trials used in the task. 
Young and Ben tall ran 16 trials and this study ran three trials for both conditions I and 2. 
A comparison of data is to some extent possible by prorating scores obtained in this study 
on the different dependent variables over 16 trials The prorated data for this study and for 
Young and Bentall (1995) showing the mean total number, range and number of correct 
hypotheses are given in Table 13. 
Young and Bentall (1995) This study 
Deluded Depressed Control Deluded Remitted Control 
Total 
Mean 37.81 39.75 40.56 29.68 31.90 39.75 
Range 
Mean 6.00 6.69 6.88 2.9 3.5 4.5 
Correct 
Mean 18.31 23 .75 24.87 14.84 22.79 28.09 
Table 13. Comparison between pro rated results in Youn~ and Ben tall (1995) and this 
study for means of total number. ran2e and number of correct hypotheses. 
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The table shows that very similar numbers of hypotheses were produced by the two control 
groups and that deluded participants in this study produced substantially fewer hypotheses 
than in Young and Bentall 's study. All three groups in this study used a smaller range of 
hypotheses than in Young and Bentall's study. This variable cannot be prorated and it is 
probable that the differences are a result of the smaller number of trials used in this study 
and the range would increase in proportion to the total number of trials in the task. A 
bigger range of correct hypotheses was obtained in this study although the results are 
broadly comparable. 
One explanation for the different results between studies is that the hypothesis testing 
deficits of deluded participants in Young and Bentall's study were concealed by learning 
effects in the deluded group over a substantially longer series of trials. As outlined above 
individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia are likely to have a range of impaired 
information processing resources. It is possible that the additional number of trials in 
Young and Ben tall 's study enabled deluded participants to improve their hypothesis testing 
skills to levels comparable with the normal control group. To verify this it would be 
necessary to examine their raw data and compare the relevant dependent variable scores 
across trials. 
Another possibility which may have produced the difference in results is that the severity 
of psychopathology in the deluded groups in the two studies may have been different. 
Neither studied quantified severity of delusional or other psychiatric symptoms. Even a 
rough measure such as the number of participants who were tested while psychiatric 
inpatients is not available as Young and Ben tall do not give this figure. However similar 
criteria for inclusion in the deluded groups were used and there are no obvious reasons why 
a significant difference between groups should exist. 
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4.4 General considerations relatin2 to the study 
A number of other factors need to be discussed in considering the findings of this study. A 
basic issue is whether participants understood both experimental tasks. The practice task 
ensured that all participants had a certain level of understanding of what was required and 
no pressure was put on them to start before they expressed confidence in knowing what 
they had do to. Care was taken to ensure all participants had the same level of 
understanding of the tasks. Couching the tasks in terms of games enabled this to be done 
fairly simply and provided good face validity for the study. The high levels of correctly 
solved rules in both conditions supports the contention that participants did understand the 
tasks. 
A second basic issue that applies to all research in this area is whether performance in 
reasoning tasks can directly be attributed to cognitive deficits or biases or whether they can 
equally well be explained by other factors. Motivational influences have not been given a 
great deal of consideration in the literature but they provide a powerful source of 
explanation for patterns in problem solving, particularly in people with persecutory 
delusions. For example it is possible that the bias of jumping to conclusions is the result of 
wanting to end the task as quickly as possible in order to leave the test conditions. Further 
research is necessary to investigate the extent of motivational influences on task 
performance and the degree to which this affects cognitive judgement. 
An exploratory aspect of the present study was to investigate the hypothesis testing 
abilities of a group who had recovered from their delusional symptoms. The consistent 
finding was that remitted group's scores fell between the deluded and control group's on 
almost every measure. On hypothesis 8 the remitted group scored significantly differently 
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from the deluded group in forming more correct hypotheses. A significant difference was 
found in the use of sensible and nonsensical responses to feedback with the remitted group 
falling between the deluded and control groups. These findings seem intuitively valid and 
potentially provide hard empirical support for the view outlined in the introduction that 
delusional thought is best conceptualised as being on a continuum with ' normal ' thought. 
However it is also possible that qualitative differences do exist in delusional cognitive 
processes but a continuum exists in the probability of the dysfunctional processes 
operating, with deluded participants using dysfunctional process more often. 
4. 5 Reliability and validity of findings 
The results found in this study need to be interpreted with caution. The small number of 
participants in the study limits the representativeness of the results and use of an 
experimental methodology also restricts how widely the results can be applied to reasoning 
in everyday situations. The need for a conservative attitude has clearly been shown in 
follow-up problem solving studies with non-psychiatric participants. Different wording of 
the experimental tasks has consistently failed to replicate original studies. Evans (1992) 
comments "The answer you get depends critically upon what particular question you ask 
and in what form you ask it". The external validity of these experimental studies is 
therefore uncertain. The fact that experimental results are so dependent upon the framing 
of questions means that simple generalisations are invalid. The most that can be claimed 
from such studies is that biases can reliably occur under certain standardised conditions 
and may lead to serious reasoning errors in everyday situations. 
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4.6 Limitations ofthe study 
This study can be criticised in a number of ways. Participants were allocated to the patient 
groups not principally on the basis of broad psychiatric diagnosis such as schizophrenia but 
rather according to the presence of persecutory delusions. Although a number of authors 
have argued for the validity of this type of approach which targets specific symptoms in 
research (Bentall, 1990a, 1990b; Bentall, Jackson and Pilgrim, 1988, Persons, 1986) it 
would be important to see if the present fmdings generalise to other psychiatric disorders. 
As previously mentioned the small sample size of the study limits the representativeness 
and generalisability of the results. 
The criteria for inclusion in the remitted group was based on the clinical judgement of the 
community teams. The reliability and validity of the inclusion criteria for this group would 
have been strengthened had an independent assessment of psychiatric symptoms been 
conducted, specifically examining the presence or absence of delusional thought. It was 
felt that this was not feasible in a study of this size as participants were drawn from teams 
throughout East Gloucestershire NHS Trust and under the medical care of four different 
consultant psychiatrists. 
In common with all other published studies in this subject area the use of a cross-sectional 
design does not permit any causal inference to be drawn between persecutory delusions and 
reasoning deficits; at best only an association between a type of reasoning deficit and a 
specific psychopathology can be demonstrated. An attempt to address this issue was made 
with the inclusion of a group whose delusions had remitted. Optimally however a 
longitudinal study would be required to investigate the course of reasoning biases and 
correlates of psychopathology. 
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A confounding factor was that all participants in the deluded and the remitted groups were 
prescribed neuroleptic medication at the time of testing. Many of the participants were 
also taking additional types of medication. Individuals had been taking different 
medications for different periods of time and in different amounts. It is also known that 
non-compliance is common with rates estimated to be at least 50% (Bebbington, 1995). 
The effect of medication on cognition is known to be complex and it is impossible to be 
certain of its impact in this type of study. For a review of the effects of neuroleptic and 
anticholinergic medication on cognitive functioning in schizophrenia the reader is referred 
to Spohn and Strauss (1989). The main conclusions from this review are that medication 
acts to normalise disordered thinking and attention/information processing dysfunctions. 
This effect may be limited to the dysfunction that occurs in acute psychotic episodes. 
Certain memory functions may be disrupted by the use of anticholinergic medication. 
Spohn and Strauss (1989) are at pains to point out the limitations ofthese conclusions and 
the limits of their generalisability. 
It is possible to argue that the effects of neuroleptic medication may reduce any cognitive 
deficits and minin1ise group differences by improving attention and information 
processing. It is also highly plausible that the side effects and intolerance of this type of 
medication cause increased sedation and slow speed of information processing. It is not 
possible to be certain about the effect of neuroleptic medication on this reasoning task and 
it remains a subject for future research. 
ln order to standardise the administration of the experiment and to optimise a similar level 
of understanding between participants condition 1 was always preceded condition 2. It was 
felt that this offered the most logical transition from practice task to experimental task and 
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that if the order of conditions were randomised this would significantly affect 
understanding of the tasks. A penalty for this was that it is possible that learning and 
fatigue effects confounded the effects of cognitive bias. However it was also thought that 
the relatively small number of trials in each condition meant that the demands made on 
participants were not sufficient for these to be significant factors. 
It was shown that matching groups for years spent in full time education was at best a very 
rough attempt to control for intelligence levels between groups. It is possible that group 
differences are purely the result of individuals in one group being more inteJligent and 
therefore better problem solvers. The use of the NART or a sub-test from the W AIS-R 
may have offered a more accurate assessment of intelligence and enabled a better between 
group matching. However Young and Bentall (1995) used the Picture Completion task and 
found no correlation between this and hypothesis testing skills. 
4. 7 Implications for clinical interventions 
The evidence is growing that cognitive-behavioural interventions can help deluded patients 
construe their experiences and symptoms in non-psychotic terms. However the precise 
way in which this can be achieved is still largely unknown and the reported intervention 
studies are essentially exploratory (Chadwick and Birchwood, 1994). The clinical 
relevance of studies like the present one is to increase knowledge of the reasoning 
processes in delusional thought which can be used to inform intervention methods. 
It will be valuable for therapists engaged with clients in evaluating the rational evidence 
supporting beliefs to be aware that deluded participants have particular difficulty m 
integrating information over time and may exhibit deficits m hypothesis testing of 
84 
sequential information. This has particular relevance in certain aspects of cognitive 
therapy in which abstract and hypothetical concepts are referred to and inferences are 
drawn about the contents of beliefs e.g. such techniques as reaction to hypothetical 
contradiction. Guidelines to therapists may be to check a shared understanding of the work 
and to explore the inferences fom1ed at regular intervals. From the results obtained from 
the remitted group it is likely that hypothesis testing skills improve as delusional systems 
weaken. 
4. 8 Future research 
Little empirical work has been carried out in this area and many aspects remain that could 
fruitfully be investigated. Further investigation is generally needed to clarify the extent of 
cognitive bias in delusional thought and the experimental circumstances in which this can 
be demonstrated. Other hypothesis testing tasks could be used to help determine this. The 
only type of hypothesis testing tasks that presently have been used have employed 
emotionally neutral stimuli. It would be interesting to evaluate the effect of emotionally 
salient material on hypothesis testing and it would be possible to integrate the emotional 
content of the material with the types of abnormal beliefs held by deluded participants and 
to examine their interaction. 
Research is also needed to advance what is known about cognitive bias in types of 
delusions other than persecutory thought e.g mamc depression. A longitudinal study 
investigating reasoning and cognitive style in deluded participants would be valuable in 
overcoming the methodological weaknesses of present studies. 
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Reasoning studies in normal participants have progressed to attempts at eliminating or 
reducing robust biases by giving instructions in problems solving tasks (e.g. Evans, 
Newstead, Alien and Pollard, 1994). Attempts to debias deluded participants may provide 
a useful starting point and give more specific information for cognitive interventions for 
modifying delusional beliefs. 
4.9 Conclusions 
The experimental results support the theory that different cognitive biases are evident in 
deluded participants compared to normal controls in certain types of hypothesis testing 
tasks, specifically in a sequential information processing task. In an unconstrained 
hypothesis testing task in which feedback was given after every response deluded 
participants' performance was equal to that of remitted and control groups on all measures. 
In a sequential information processing task deluded participants formed fewer hypotheses, 
from a smaller range of hypotheses and formed a smaller number of correct hypotheses 
than controls. 
Deluded participants also used information about hypotheses they had formed less 
rationally than both remitted and control participants. Although these results may be 
explained by cognitive impairments in deluded participants the production of a greater 
number of nonsensical responses to feedback and the equal performance in condition 1 
provides evidence of specific cognitive bias. A dissociation effect was produced between 
the two experimental conditions and in the use of sensible and nonsensical use of feedback 
suggesting that specific cognitive biases are evident in the inductive reasoning skills of 
deluded participants. 
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The need for caution in interpreting the results and the generalisations that are valid about 
the inductive reasoning skills of deluded individuals in everyday situations were made. 
For increased reliability the reasoning of deluded individuals needs further investigation, 
using different research methodologies and using different reasoning tasks with different 
delusional subtypes. 
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Appendix 1 
Approval for from East Gloucestershire NHS Trust Ethics Committee 
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0 ~LOUCESTERSHIRE 
~ HEALTH .AUTHORITY . 
OurRef: 
Please ask for. 
Beryl Elliott Clerk to the East Gloucestershire Ethics Committee 
23rd May 1996 
M.r Ian Baker 
Trainee Cl.injcal Psychologist 
Department of Cl.injcal Psychology 
Delancey Hospital 
Charlton Lane 
Cheltenham Glos GL53 9DU 
Dear lan 
VICTORIA WAREHOUSE 
THE DOCKS 
GLOUCESTER GL 1 2EL 
TEL: (01462) 300222 
FAX: (01452, 318800 
TEL: (Direct) 
(01462) 
FAX: (Onct) 
(01452) 
RE: 96/16- INDUCTWE REASONING IN DELUSIONAL THOUGHT 
Many thanks for your excellent proposal and for attending to clear up any difficult points. I can confirm 
that the Committee have approved your application and wish you well in its application. We will, of 
course, require that you update us in one year's time as to whether the trial is finished and its outcome, 
or whether it is continuing. 
Good Luck. 
Yours sincerely 
)10~ 
·--MIKE RICHARDS 
Chairman - East Glos LREC 
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APPENDIX2 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
You have been invited to participate in a study looking at how people solve 
problems. It is known that different people solve problems in different ways 
and researchers are interested in the various types of strategies that are used. 
This study may be beneficial in providing information about the ways in 
which people reason. This is helpful in certain types of clinical treatment. 
This study involves two tasks using a set of patterned cards. The aim of the 
task is to work out a rule which the researcher is using to sort cards into a 
category. The task will take about 30 minutes to complete. 
You may decline to participate in the study or having given consent you may 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason. No displeasure or penalty 
will be incurred for non-participation. 
If you require any further information about the study please contact: 
lan Baker 
Department of Clinical Psychology 
Delancey Hospital 
Charlton Lane 
Cheltenham 
Glos. GL53 9DU 
Tel: 01242 272183 
April 1996. 
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Appendix 3 
CONSENT FORM 
Study title: Inductive Reasonin2 in Persecutory Delusional Thought 
Have you read the Participant Information Sheet? 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study? 
Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions? 
Have you received enough information about the study? 
Who have you spoken to? 
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study: 
• At any time 
• Without having to give a reason for withdrawing 
• And without affecting your future medical care? 
Do you agree to take part in this study? 
Signed ........... ....... ........ ..... .. .... .. .. ..... ......... .... ....... ..... ....... ...... .... . 
Date ........... .. ....... . 
(Name in block letters) 
Parent/Guardian/Carer 
Date ....... .... ......... .. 
(Name in block letters) 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Signed (Researcher) Date ...... ... ... .. ... ... . 
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Certainty Rating Scale 
Absolutely 
Certain 
Fairly 
Certain 
Appendix 4 
Unsure 
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Fairly 
Uncertain 
Absolutely 
Uncertain 
Appendix 5 
Experiment Randornisation Schedule 
Three sets (I , 2 &3) of 16 stimulus cards were produced with feedback and non-feedback 
cards randomised within each set. Two features (A and B) were randomly chosen for each 
set giving six solutions to be determined. Each featured was given to each group twice and 
randomised within and between groups. The randomisation for each group is shown 
below. 
Group 
Deluded Remitted Control 
participant Condition 1 Condition2 Condition 1 Condition2 Condition 1 Condition2 
Pl lB 3B.2B 2B 3B lA lB 2A 3A 3B lA 2A IB 2A 3B l A 3A 2A 
P2 l A 2B 3B 3A lA 2B 2A 3B lA 2A lB 3B 3B 2A lA 2A 3B lA 
P3 2A 3B l A 3A 2A lB lA 3A 2B 3A 2B lA lA 2A 3B 2B 3A lB 
P4 lA 2B 3A 3B l A 2A 2B 3A lA lA 3B 2B 2B 3A lA l A 2A 3B 
P5 2A l A 3A lA 3B 2A 2A 3B lB 2A lA 3A lB 2A 3B 2B lA 3A 
P6 2A 3A lB 2B lB 3B 2B 3A lB 2B 3A lB 3A lB 2B 3B lB 2A 
P7 2A 3A lB 2A 3A lB 3B 2B lB 1A2A 3A 2B 3B lA 2B 3A lA 
P8 lA 3B 2B lA 2B 3A lA 2A 3B 2B l A 3B lB 3B 2A lB 2A 3B 
P9 lA 2B 3A 2A lB 3B 2B lA 3A 2A 3B lB 1B.3A2A 2B lA 3A 
PlO 2A lB 3B lB 2B 3B 3B 2B lA 3B 2B lB 2B lA 3A lB 3B 2A 
Pll lB 3B 2B 3A 2A l A lB 2A 3A 3A 2A lB lB 2B 3A 2B 3B lB 
P12 lB 2A 3A lB 2B 3A 2A 3B lB lB 3A 2B 2B lA 3A lB 2B 3A 
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